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Abstract 
Assisted reproduction technology (ART) creates an opportunity for the creation 
of co-parenting arrangements involving donors and surrogates. Donor and 
surrogate involvement in the lives of children born using ART has received 
increased media attention recently and is a matter of considerable social 
significance. This dissertation attempts to test the law’s restriction to two 
parents in light of the potential for co-parenting arrangements. In order to do this, 
it adopts a socio-legal approach by considering the law within its social context 
and using empirical research methods to canvass opinion in relation to this from 
appropriate purposively selected research participants.  
 
The study employed a mixed methods approach, using an online questionnaire 
and telephone interviews, to collect empirical data on the views of people who 
have become (or intend to become) parents using ART, in relation to 
donor/surrogate involvement and legal recognition. These data were analysed 
using a constructivist grounded theory approach in order to generate theory 
from data and explore how participants construct and interpret their own social 
reality. 
 
This was necessarily a small-scale project that nevertheless successfully 
captured a range of views in relation to donor/surrogate involvement and legal 
recognition. The overall impression from the data was that co-parenting may not 
be a particularly attractive concept for heterosexual couples but it might be 
something that same-sex couples would seek. The study also highlighted the 
need for further research in this area, particularly in relation to same-sex 
couples.  
 
Word Count: 17930
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1. Introduction 
Families are important within society.1 It is within the family that ‘we negotiate 
an urgent need for belonging with an equally urgent need for autonomy’.2 There 
is considerable debate, however, about what constitutes a family.3 Some seek 
to define a family based on the traditional hetero-normative nuclear family. Such 
a definition relies heavily on formal structures such as marriage.4 This might 
suggest a model of family law that privileges and supports formalised unions 
within families over mere cohabitation. This definition, however, can lead to the 
disenfranchisement of people who consider themselves to be families but do not 
fall within this definition. As Douglas highlights, ‘non-recognition is equally 
important to the discussion…what is left out may be as important as what is 
included, in understanding the content of family law and the messages it may 
send.’5 
One of the central features of the family, and thus one of the main areas of 
concern for family law, is the parent-child relationship.6 Children are seen as an 
intrinsic part of what constitutes a family. 7  There is, however, considerable 
controversy as to who qualifies as a parent.8 This is an important issue in family 
law because legal parenthood is considered as being that which ‘makes the 
                                            
1This statement has received Government recognition from both the current Coalition and 
previous Labour Government (see Daily Telegraph, ‘David Cameron: family matters to children 
more than income’ 11 January 2010; and Cabinet Office, Families in Britain (The Stationary 
Office, London 2008)). It has also been recognised by the House of Lords (see Huang v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11 [18]). See also Jonathan Herring, 
Family law (Longman law series, 5th edn Longman, Harlow 2011) 1. 
2  Alison Diduck, Law's Families (Butterworths law in context series, Butterworths, London 2003) 
1. 
3See Jonathan Herring, Family law (Longman law series, 5th edn Longman, Harlow 2011) 1 for 
a more detailed discussion. 
4See Lisa Glennon. ''Obligations between adult partners: Moving from form to function?' (2008) 
22(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 22 for a discussion of the relevance of 
this view to modern families. 
5  Gillian Douglas, An introduction to family law (Clarendon law series, 2nd edn Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2004) 228. 
6For discussions on how parenthood has replaced marriage as the central organizing concept of 
family law see Lisa Glennon. ''Obligations between adult partners: Moving from form to 
function?' (2008) 22(1) International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 22, 24 and John 
Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean (eds), Family law (Oxford readings in socio-legal studies, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1994) 18. 
7See Andrew Bainham. 'Family Law in a Pluralistic Society' (1995) 22 Journal of Law and 
Society 234, 244 and Sue Dyson, The option of parenthood (Sheldon, London 1993) 13. 
8See for example Emily Jackson, 'What is a Parent?' in Alison Diduck and Katherine O'Donovan 
(eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge-Cavendish, London 2006) 59 and 
Andrew Bainham and others, What is a parent? : a socio-legal analysis (Hart Pub., Oxford 1999) 
297. 
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child a member of a family, generating for that child a legal relationship with 
wider kin going well beyond the parental relationship’.9 Therefore, the way in 
which the law confers legal parenthood is significant because this determines 
whether children and potential parents are considered as part of a family unit. 
The importance of the parent-child relationship has been highlighted in the 
context of post-separation families.10 In addition, problems can arise in step-
families as a result of the lack of automatic legal recognition of the relationship 
between step-parent and child.11 The issue of who is considered to be a child’s 
parent is especially significant, however, in the context of families created 
through artificial reproduction. There are different forms of artificial reproduction 
used by different types of families, each with different consequences for the 
legal recognition of the parent-child relationship. In a sense any type of artificial 
reproduction raises potential complications for the question of who is to be 
considered the parent because artificial reproduction separates 
biological/genetic relatedness from the intention to care for a child.12 However, 
the complications associated with legal parenthood affect alternative families13 
particularly strongly because for them it is a matter of being recognised as a 
valid family.14 
Heterosexual couples who make use of artificial reproductive technology of 
whatever sort face difficulties in relation to the child’s right to know about his or 
her genetic origin.15 However, they may choose to conceal the child’s means of 
conception and thereby appear to conform to the traditional hetero-normative 
image of the family. By contrast, same-sex couples must face up to the reality of 
                                            
9  Andrew Bainham, 'Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet 
Important Distinctions' in Andrew Bainham, Shelley Day Sclater and Martin Richards (eds), 
What is a parent? : a socio-legal analysis (Hart Pub., Oxford 1999) 33. 
10For a discussion of the importance for the welfare of the child of maintaining a relationship with 
each parent following divorce see Martin Richards, 'Divorcing Children: Roles for Parents and 
the State' in Mavis Maclean and Jacek Kurczewski (eds), Families, politics and the law : 
perspectives for East and West Europe (Clarendon, Oxford 1993) 308. 
11  Marjorie Smith. 'New Stepfamilies - a descriptive study of a largely unseen group' (2003) 
15(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 185, 196. 
12  Jonathan Herring, Family law (Longman law series, 5th edn Longman, Harlow 2011) 322. 
13 Alternative families (or non-traditional families) here is contrasted with traditional nuclear 
families and especially refers to same-sex couples. See Barbara Cox, ‘Alternative Families’ 
(2000) Wisconsin Women’s Law Review 93, 95 
14  Aleardo Zanghellini. 'Lesbian and Gay Parents and Reproductive Technologies: The 2008 
Australian and UK Reforms' (2010) 18(3) Feminist Legal Studies 227, 229. 
15  Caroline Jones, 'The identification of “parents” and “siblings”:  new possibilities under the 
reformed Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act ' in Julie A. Wallbank, Shazia Choudhry and 
Jonathan Herring (eds), Rights, gender, and family law (Routledge, Abingdon 2010) 292. 
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their child’s means of conception. This does not necessitate that other 
participants in the artificial reproduction process (such as sperm/egg donor or 
surrogate) need to be involved in the child’s life, just as the position that 
opposite-sex couple are in, does not necessitate that such people should be 
excluded. However, a number of same-sex couples, perhaps because of the 
undeniable reality of how the child was conceived, are choosing to engage in 
co-parenting projects with the other participant(s) in the artificial reproduction 
process.16 
This study is situated within the now well-established tradition of socio-legal 
research in family law.17 As such, it goes beyond the mere analysis of legal 
doctrine and considers the social context in which the law operates. In order to 
achieve this, empirical data will be collected. However, as Eekelaar and 
Maclean highlight, the collection of empirical data would be insufficient in itself 
to make this a rigorous socio-legal study: 
socio-legal studies implies much more than assembling empirical 
information about how legal institutions work or describing what 
lawyers or other actors say that they do. The way in which such 
knowledge is sought, how it is interpreted, and the use to which it 
is put occur within a wider set of values and objectives.18 
In light of this, the empirical data that are gathered will be discussed within an 
interpretive theoretical framework drawing on socio-legal theory.19 In this way 
the study will consider aspects of the law surrounding parenthood as a ‘study of 
a field of social experience’20 rather than as a purely regulatory framework. As 
such, the study will explore not only whether parenthood following ART is 
regulated in an appropriate way but also the ways in which the law impacts on 
our understanding of parenthood. This accords with Cotterrell’s view of socio-
legal studies which is designed to ‘contribute to theoretical analysis of the 
                                            
16  See AA v BB (2007) ONCA 2 and Deborah Dempsey, ‘Conceiving and Negotiating 
Reproductive Relationships: Lesbians and Gay Men Forming Families with Children’ (2010) 44 
Sociology 1145. 
17 For a discussion of the various socio-legal studies in family law see Alison Diduck, Law's 
Families (Butterworths law in context series, Butterworths, London 2003) vi.  
18  John Eekelaar and Mavis Maclean (eds), Family law (Oxford readings in socio-legal studies, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994) 1. 
19 See Chapter 5: Legal Recognition p 58 – 59. 
20  Roger Cotterrell. 'Subverting Orthodoxy, Making Law Central: A View of Sociolegal Studies' 
(2002) 29 Journal of Law and Society 632, 633. 
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nature of law in society, to a deeper understanding of legal doctrines and 
institutions in general…’21 
Methodologically speaking, this study is influenced by the feminist social 
constructionist research culture. This highlights the way in which social 
practices are a product of culture rather than nature and can be created and 
influenced by the law. As Lacey highlights, ‘[f]eminist legal theorists are hence 
of the view that gender relations are open to revision through the modification of 
powerful social institutions such as law’.22 On this basis, the study will consider 
individual family practices23 and the effect that law has in constituting these 
practices. The study will demonstrate that the law of parenthood is attempting to 
impose a model of the family that privileges the homo-nuclear sexual family 
model,24 which may have the effect of excluding certain family forms within 
society.  
The recognition of multiple parents relates to the definition of the family that the 
law should adopt. By granting formal recognition to each of the adults who 
intended to care for the child from the start the law would be adopting a more 
functional approach to the family. This approach is advocated as an alternative 
to the formalist approach mentioned earlier.25 The legal definition of the family, 
and of parenthood, should not necessarily depend on our everyday 
understanding of these terms, firstly because how these terms are interpreted 
may differ and reflect differing values and beliefs26 and secondly because this 
fails to appreciate the characteristic role these terms play within family law. In 
this regard, Hart’s admonition that legal theory should not be built on the 
definition of legal terms abstracted from their function within the legal system 
seems apposite.27 By allowing for the possibility of more than two parents in the 
context of assisted reproduction the law would be dealing with ‘the 
                                            
21  Roger Cotterrell, Law's community : legal theory in sociological perspective (Oxford socio-
legal studies, Clarendon, Oxford 1995) 77. 
22  Nicola Lacey, Unspeakable subjects : feminist essays in legal and social theory (Hart, Oxford 
1998) 3. 
23For the importance of this see D. H. J. Morgan, Family connections : an introduction to family 
studies (Polity, Cambridge 1996). 
24  Martha Albertson Fineman, The neutered mother, the sexual family, and other twentieth 
century tragedies (Routledge, New York ; London 1995) 143. 
25  Lisa Glennon. 'Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association LTD - An Endorsement of the 
Functional Family' (2000) 14 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 226. 
26  Jonathan Herring, Family law (Longman law series, 5th edn Longman, Harlow 2011) 2. 
27  H. L. A. Hart, 'Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence' in Essays in jurisprudence and 
philosophy (Clarendon, Oxford 1983). 
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consequences of “caring and sharing”’28 that are created in such co-parenting 
arrangements by legally recognising the role that these adults are already 
playing in the child’s life as social parents.  
This dissertation aims to examine the law’s approach to parentage following 
ART in these two jurisdictions and to explore the views of people who have 
made use of such technology in relation to donor/surrogate involvement in their 
children’s lives. Through the use and analysis of self-completion questionnaires, 
the study attempts to gauge how desirable donor/surrogate involvement is as 
well as the level of legal recognition this deserves. Follow-up semi-structured 
interviews are used to explore in more depth participant’s reasons and 
motivations for these views. Finally participant’s responses to the current level 
of legal recognition in each jurisdiction will be examined through the use of 
vignettes in both the questionnaires and interviews. 
This situation, where three (or potentially more) adults seek recognition as the 
child’s parents has not been adequately addressed in the law of England and 
Wales, which limits the number of parents a child has to two.29 This dissertation 
will critically evaluate the rationale for limiting the number of parents in this way 
and assess whether there is sufficient justification for preventing additional 
parents to be recognised in law. The following chapter will consider the basis on 
which parenthood should be conferred. It will do this by discussing previous 
empirical research and academic articles on parenthood and assisted 
reproduction as well as the judicial framework that currently operates in England 
and Wales 30  and California. 31  After outlining this studies methodological 
approach in chapter three, the study will go on to discuss the results of the 
empirical study in relation to views on donor/surrogate involvement and legal 
recognition in chapters four and five respectively.  
                                            
28  Anne Bottomley and Simone Wong (eds), Changing contours of domestic life, family and 
law : Caring and sharing (Oñati international series in law and society, Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2009) 4. 
29 See Julie McCandless and Sally Sheldon. 'The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family' (2010) 73(2) MLR 175, 193. 
30 Referred to as E&W throughout the paper. 
31 This will allow for comparison of two systems that limit the number of parents to two but 
allocate legal parenthood in different ways in order to reflect on how the law in England and 
Wales might be reformed. For more details on the selection of these jurisdictions and the legal 
framework see Chapter 2: Literature Review pp 16 – 17. 
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The reform of legal parentage resulting from assisted reproduction is currently a 
highly topical and controversial issue. 32  There is a growing realisation that 
increasingly out-dated legal rules are no longer instep with social reality.33 This 
issue is of considerable significance to society because it extends beyond the 
rights of parents and impacts on the rights of children, which there is a clear 
political mandate to protect.34 As Professor Lowe highlights, ‘children do not live 
in a vacuum, but within a family and an important part of their protection is that 
the family unit, no matter what form it takes, enjoys adequate and equal legal 
recognition and protection. In other words, it is as discriminating to the child to 
limit legal parenthood or to deny significant carers legal right and responsibilities 
as to accord the child a different status and legal rights according to the 
circumstance of their birth or upbringing’.35 This goes to the very heart of family 
law and engages tensions within the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which guarantees the right to marry and found a family36 as well as a right to 
private and family life. 37  This study aims to investigate the possibility of 
recognising more than two parents so that alternative families who wish to 
engage in co-parenting arrangements with the donor/surrogate are not 
marginalised and forced to do so without any legal protection.38 
                                            
32  Craig Lind and Tom Hewitt. 'Law  and the complexities of parenting: parental status and 
parental function' (2009) 31(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 391. 
33  Jenni Millbank. 'The Limits of Functional Family: Lesbian Mother Litigation in the Era of the 
Eternal Biological Family' (2008) 22 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 149; 
Loveday Hodson and ILGA Europe. 'The Rights of Children Raised in Lesbian, Gay,  Bi-sexual 
or Transgender Families: A European Perspective' (2008) 
<www.ilgaeurope.org/content/download/.../2/.../Children's+Report_03.pdf> accessed 2 
September 2011.   
34  European Convention on the Legal Status of  Children Born Out of Wedlock 1975 ; United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the  Child 1989 ; Geraldine Van Beuren. 'Child Rights in 
Europe, Convergence and Divergence  in Judicial Protection' (Strasbourg 2008) . 
35  Nigel Lowe. 'A study into the rights and legal status of  children being brought up in various 
forms of marital or non-marital  partnerships and cohabitation: A Report for the attention of the 
Committee of  Experts on Family Law of the Council of Europe ' (Strasbourg 2009) 
<http://www.coe.int/t/DGHL/STANDARDSETTING/FAMILY/CJ-
FA%20_2008_%205%20E%2025%2009%2009.pdf> accessed 2 September 2011 accessed 2 
September 2011. 
36  European Convention on Human Rights art 12. 
37  Ibid art 8. 
38 Although this is not a central issue in the present study, the issue of co-parenting may be of 
some relevance to single parents who wish to involve the donor/surrogate in their children’s 
lives. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The question of what a parent is has been the subject of much academic 
discussion both in general family law and in the assisted reproduction context. 
Who is legally considered a child’s parent is determined by legislation and case 
law. Although this has an impact on who society and individual families consider 
to be a parent, legal and social recognition do not necessarily entirely 
correspond to one another. The concept of a parent is socially constructed and 
one of the factors that influences this is legal recognition.39 However, individual 
family practices also play a part in who constitutes a parent in the eyes of a 
given family. Both individual family practices and the legal framework that 
regulates them exist within a given social context, which varies depending on 
the jurisdiction. Different jurisdictions have adopted different approaches to the 
issue of parentage following assisted reproduction. California, for example, 
seems to adopt a more intent-based approach to surrogacy than E&W, which 
may be partly attributable to the different social context surrounding surrogacy 
in these two jurisdictions. This point will be explored in more detail in the 
following section.40 
This section will begin by outlining the legal framework that determines legal 
parenthood in E&W and California and the social context in which the law 
operates. In each jurisdiction the primary legislation has been interpreted to a 
greater or lesser extent by the courts resulting in divergent approaches. It is 
important to appreciate the legal context in which families within these 
jurisdictions exist because this will provide the background for interpreting the 
empirical data gathered in each of the jurisdictions. However, it is also important 
to consider the social context within which the law operates, which will also be 
explored in this chapter. This can be useful when attempting to explain 
differences in approach between the two jurisdictions. For this reason a socio-
legal approach to the research is appropriate in order to be able to consider how 
                                            
39 Katharine Baker, ‘Bionormativity and the Construction of Parenthood’ (2008) 42 Georgia Law 
Review 649. 
40 See pp 15 – 17. 
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the law actually operates within these different jurisdictions and also what 
values underpin the varying legal approaches.41 
Following on from this, the section will consider the academic literature on the 
definition of a parent. Much of the discussion around parenthood considers 
post-separation families, step-families and adoption. These discussions 
highlight many of the same issues that are raised in the assisted reproduction 
context and are, therefore, highly relevant in the present context. This will feed 
into a discussion of the correct basis for identifying who should be considered a 
parent. This is no simple matter and involves deciding between competing 
claims such as a biological connection, the intention to procreate and the 
psychological/caring relationship that exists with the child. Having discussed 
who should be recognised as a parent, the section will go on to consider the 
possibility of recognising more than two parents. This will involve analysing the 
academic commentary on the subject as well as empirical studies particularly in 
the assisted reproduction context, using an interdisciplinary approach. This 
section, as with the whole dissertation, adopts a comparative approach in that it 
will consider academic literature and studies from California, as well as E&W, 
drawing on other jurisdictions to supplement the analysis where appropriate.  
2.2 Social Context 
Estimates by the HFEA suggest that infertility affects between 1 in 6 and 1 in 7 
couples in the United Kingdom,42 which is similar to the number affected in the 
United States.43 This has resulted in approximately 2,000 children per year 
being born in the UK as a result of gamete donation.44 In the United States, over 
7,000 children were born in 2008 using egg donation alone.45 The number of 
children born through surrogacy is lower but remains significant. In the United 
                                            
41  Reza Banakar and Max Travers, Theory and method in socio-legal research (Oñati 
international series in law and society, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005) xi. See also CM Campbell 
and Paul Wiles. 'The Study of Law in Society in Britain' (1976) 10 Law and Society Review 553. 
42<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/infertility-facts.html#1248> accessed 1 September 2011.  
43<http://www.uptodate.com/contents/patient-information-evaluation-of-the-infertile-couple> 
accessed 1 September 2011. 
44<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/donor-conception-births.html> accessed 1 September 2011. This 
includes both sperm and egg donation. 
45<http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2008/PDF/ART_2008_Full.pdf> p 91 accessed 1 September 
2011. Only the statistics for egg donation were readily available in the United States because 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention do no include artificial insemination in their 
definition of ART. 
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Kingdom estimates vary between 700 and 1000 surrogacy births since 1985.46 
In the United States the number is significantly higher with over 5,000 births 
from gestational surrogacy between 2004 and 2008.47 The highest proportion of 
these births, 23%, were in California.48 One explanation for this may be the 
liberal legal climate that surrounds surrogacy in California, unlike many other 
US states.49 This will be discussed in more detail in the following section. 
Third-party assisted conception, therefore, affects a significant number of adults 
and children in both the United Kingdom and United States. The social 
significance of issues surrounding ART has recently been highlighted in the 
media through various television documentaries such as ‘I’m Pregnant with 
Their Baby’50 which charts the journey of three women who, out of altruism, 
agree to act as surrogates for couples they do not know and the problems they 
face when they have to give up their baby. This programme raises issues 
particularly relevant to the current study such as the desire for surrogate 
involvement following birth and the need to have clear legal regulation of 
parenthood. A further documentary, called ‘Donor Mum: The Children I’ve Never 
Met’,51 charts the journey of an egg donor as she tries to establish contact with 
her biological children, and her son, who was born through sperm donation, as 
he tries to track down his biological father. This programme emphasised the 
effect that decisions the parents make about having a child can have on that 
child in later life. This is relevant in relation to the current study because it 
suggests that some degree of donor involvement, or at least contact, might be 
beneficial for the child from an early stage in case they want to establish a 
relationship later on. This sentiment is reflected in the responses of a number of 
participants.52 Although the law has moved away from completely anonymous 
                                            
46<http://www.surrogacyuk.org/> accessed 1 September 2011.  
47<http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pageDocuments/KAEVEJ0A1M.pdf> p 7 
accessed 1 September 2011. 
48Ibid. 10. 
49Ibid. 29. 
50<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b013y232> accessed 1 September 2011 and broadcast 
on BBC1 on 23 August 2011.  
51<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b0146g40> accessed 1 September and broadcast on BBC 
1 on 30 August 2011.  
52Jane for example comments that ‘having conceived twins through egg donation, I have always 
found it a great loss to not have the option to access further information about the donor, aside 
from the bare minimum. So if an alternative had been available I certainly would have explored 
it.’ See Chapter 4 for further discussion of this. 
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donation in response to the future needs of the children,53 this is an area where 
the views of donor-conceived people have been traditionally underrepresented 
and further research should be conducted into this.54 
Whilst assisted reproduction is highly topical and affects a growing number of 
people in the US and UK, the social, political and legal climate, particularly 
surrounding surrogacy, differs between E&W and California, the two 
jurisdictions being compared in the present study. In California, surrogacy is 
quite a polarising issue particularly in relation to regulation of the industry as 
was highlight by the recent baby-selling scandal.55 Such strength of feeling has 
been engendered by the possibility of exploitation of surrogates as a result of 
the permissibility of commercial surrogacy. In E&W, however, commercial 
surrogacy is illegal.56 Therefore, there is more ambivalence towards the whole 
issue of surrogacy, which is not as well developed as it is in California. It is on 
the backdrop of this social context that the legal rules must be understood and 
evaluated, as is consistent with the socio-legal approach. 
2.3 Legal Framework 
In E&W, legal parenthood following assisted reproduction is governed by part 2 
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008.57 Recognition of the legal 
mother of the child is a straightforward matter because it attaches to the woman 
who gives birth to the child. 58  This merely applies the rule that existed at 
common law to the assisted reproduction context.59 Therefore, the act does not 
contemplate the possibility of a child being legally motherless.60 A child can only 
have one more parent, who can be either male, referred to as the father, or 
                                            
53 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Disclosure of Donor Information) Regulations 
2004. This enables a donor-conceived person over the age of 18 conceived following gamete or 
embryo donation taking place after April 2005 to request the identity of their donor from the 
HFEA. See Lucy Frith et al. ‘UK Gamete Donors’ Reflection on the Removal of Anonymity’ 
(2007) 22(6) Human Reproduction 1675.  
54I’m grateful to the participants who emphasized this point in their responses and comments on 
the study. 
55<http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/genetic-crossroads/201108/surrogacy-and-baby-
selling-another-fertility-industry-scandal> accessed 1 September 2011. 
56 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985. 
57 The 2008 Act or the Act. 
58 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, s 33(1) 
59 Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] AC 547 at p. 577. 
60 In France, there is the possibility of having motherless children because women have the right 
to conceive anonymously. See Nadine Lefaucheur. 'French Tradition of Anonymous Birth: The 
Lines of Argument' (2004) 18 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 319. 
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female, referred to as the child’s second female parent.61 This second parent 
must meet certain conditions which revolve around his or her consent to be 
treated as a second parent, along with that of the mother. 
In California, the Uniform Parentage Act62 defines who is considered a child’s 
parent. In contrast to the 2008 Act, this was not specifically enacted to deal with 
the modern demands of assisted reproduction but rather enacts the federal 
uniform parentage act from 1973 designed primarily to deal with illegitimacy. 
Although the Uniform Parentage Act mentions gestation as a possible basis for 
recognising someone as the legal mother of the child, it does not consider 
gestation as determinative of the matter in the way that the 2008 Act does.63 
Again, however, a child can only have two parents. The legislation itself 
contemplates the second parent as being a father. However, the courts have 
extended this to include a second female parent.64 There are a number of ways 
that a person can be recognised as a second parent including being registered 
on the birth certificate, accepting the child into his or her home or if there is a 
marriage between the second parent and mother.65 
Whilst the courts in E&W apply faithfully the rule that gestation demonstrates 
who the legal mother is, the courts in California have interpreted the Californian 
legislation to different effect. In Johnson v Calvert,66 the Californian Supreme 
Court held that a gestational surrogate was not the legal mother of the child but 
rather the egg contributor who also intended to raise the child. This outcome 
was possible because of the wording of the legislative provision which did not 
state that gestation conclusively determines legal motherhood.67 In Johnson v 
Calvert it seems to have been the combination of genetic connection and the 
intention to procreate that trumped the gestational surrogate’s claim. This was 
extended in Buzzanca 68  where a non-genetically related woman who had 
commissioned a gestational surrogate was considered to be the legal mother. In 
                                            
61  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 ss36 and 42. 
62 Contained in Part 3, Division 12 of the Californian Family Code (UPA). 
63 ‘between a child and the natural mother, [the parent child relationship] may be established by 
proof of her having given birth to the child, or under this part’ Californian Family Code s 7610. 
64  Elisa B 37 Cal 4th 108 . 
65 Californian Family Code s 7611. 
66  Johnson v Calvert (1993) 5 Cal 4th 84 . This case will be discussed further below. 
67 See above n 62. 
68In re Marriage of Buzzanca (1998) 72 Cal Rptr 2d, 282  
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this case, the egg donor was anonymous and the gestational surrogate did not 
try to claim she was the legal mother. 
2.4 Definition of a Parent 
These different legal approaches lead to a discussion about the most suitable 
basis for conferring legal parenthood. The legislation in E&W adopts a clear 
preference in favour of gestation as the basis for allocating legal motherhood 
over claims based on genetics or intention to procreate. Whilst the Californian 
legislation is not definitive on this matter, the courts have interpreted the 
legislation to mean that the claims of the gestational mother may be trumped by 
the genetic mother or even the mother who intended to procreate the child. It is 
not clear, however, how far this would stretch. For example the outcome may 
well be in favour of a traditional surrogate because she would be linked by 
gestation and genetics even though she had no intention to procreate the child 
and raise him or her as her own. 
The issue now that warrants consideration is which of the potential bases for 
claiming parenthood deserves to win out. Biology has traditionally been the key 
component in determining who the mother is. Before the advent of assisted 
reproductive techniques there was no separation between genetic relation and 
gestation. Therefore, identifying the biological mother was a simple matter and it 
was she who was the legal mother of the child. Identifying the legal father was 
also a matter of biology. However because this was more difficult to determine 
than the biological mother, the legal father was the man who was married to the 
mother. This operated as a presumption that that man was the child’s genetic 
father, which more recently can be rebutted with evidence to the contrary.69 
Nevertheless, whether through the act of gestation or via a legal presumption, 
traditionally the law ascribed legal parenthood on the basis of biology. 
This approach seems to accord with common sense in the context of traditional 
families. However, assisted reproduction provides an opportunity to reassess 
this because it creates a disconnect between biological relatedness and the 
intention to raise the child. Although ART does present an opportunity for 
reassessment of the primacy of biology in conferring legal parenthood, some 
still consider biology as the most suitable basis for this. Andrew Bainham has 
                                            
69 Family Law Reform Act 1969, s 26. 
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consistently argued that ‘being a parent should turn on a presumed or actual 
genetic connection with the child’.70 This contention seems to be premised on 
the suggestion that to do otherwise would be to ignore or deny the biological 
truth of the matter and to ‘distort and misrepresent kinship’.71 
This approach has, however, not been adopted in the 2008 Act which 
recognises that two female parents can automatically be recognised as the 
parents of a child from birth. This clearly does not reflect the biological reality or 
truth of the conception of that child. It is for this reason that Therese Callus has 
criticised the reforms arguing that ‘[b]y recognising the status of two female 
parents, the child's identity is thrown into disarray because the recognition of 
two female parents conceals the necessary heterosexual element of human 
existence’.72 The importance of biology, evident in both Bainham and Callus’s 
arguments, has received some support in judicial dicta. In Re G, for example, 
Lord Nicholls commented that ‘in the ordinary way the rearing of a child by his 
or her biological parent can be expected to be in the child's best interests…I 
decry any tendency to diminish the significance of this factor.’ 73  Indeed, 
Bainham relies on the judgment of Baroness Hale in that case to reinforce his 
point, stating that. ‘[w]e therefore have it on high authority that we should pause 
before equating the position of the biological parent with that of the lesbian 
partner’.74 
It seems questionable, however, whether the judgment in Re G does give 
preference, to any great extent, to the claims of biological parents over 
competing claims. Baroness Hale explicitly recognises that a natural parent can 
be created in three ways: genetic parenthood, gestational parenthood or 
social/psychological parenthood. This gives the impression that a person can be 
considered the natural parent if one of these criteria are met even if the other 
two are not. Therefore the statement that ‘the fact that CG is the natural mother 
of these children in every sense of that term, while raising no presumption in her 
                                            
70  Andrew Bainham, 'Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet 
Important Distinctions' in Andrew Bainham, Shelley Day Sclater and Martin Richards (eds), 
What is a parent? : a socio-legal analysis (Hart Pub., Oxford 1999) 27. 
71  Andrew Bainham. 'Arguments about parentage' (2008) 67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 322, 
341. 
72  Thérèse Callus. 'First 'Designer Babies', Now À La Carte Parents' (2008) Family Law 143, 
147. 
73  Re G [2006] UKHL 43 [2] . 
74  Andrew Bainham. 'Arguments about parentage' (2008) 67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 322, 
340. 
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favour, is undoubtedly an important and significant factor in determining what 
will be best for them now and in the future’,75 does not imply that biology was 
the decisive factor in finding in her favour over the claims of her former partner. 
The fact is that that CG had been the children’s primary caregiver. Therefore, 
the House of Lords’ judgment seems to be underpinned by the desire not to 
disrupt the children’s lives rather than by any preference in favour of the 
biological parent. 
In his argument supporting the primacy of biology, Bainham suggests that the 
values that govern the determination of parentage ought to be ‘a commitment to 
truth, individual autonomy and priority for the interests of…the children’. 76 
Bainham suggests that the commitment to (biological) truth indicates that 
biological parentage is important and that a child has an interest in knowing who 
his or her biological parents are. It does not follow, as Bainham suggests, that 
the separation of biological and legal parentage following assisted reproduction 
is inconsistent with the principle of biological truth. These arguments perhaps 
support the case for a more accurate birth certificate, as some have argued 
for,77 which would record the biological as well as legal parents. It is, however, 
not the function of legal parenthood to record biological truth. In fact, legal 
parenthood would seem to serve a very different function within these families. 
As Bainham and others have demonstrated,78 parental status is not about the 
bundle of rights and responsibilities required to raise a child. This is addressed 
by the concept of parental responsibility. Rather being a parent is what makes 
children and otherwise unrelated adults part of a family. 79  Therefore when 
identifying the values that should underpin the determination of parenthood, the 
function of parental status needs to be borne in mind. If the function of parental 
                                            
75  Re G [2006] UKHL 43 [44] . 
76  Andrew Bainham. 'Arguments about parentage' (2008) 67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 322, 
323. 
77  Caroline Jones, 'Parents in Law: Subjective Impacts and Status Implications around the Use 
of Licensed Donor Insemination' in Alison Diduck and Katherine O'Donovan (eds), Feminist 
perspectives on family law (Routledge-Cavendish, London 2006) 94. 
78  Andrew Bainham, 'Parentage, Parenthood and Parental Responsibility: Subtle, Elusive Yet 
Important Distinctions' in Andrew Bainham, Shelley Day Sclater and Martin Richards (eds), 
What is a parent? : a socio-legal analysis (Hart Pub., Oxford 1999) 33. 
79See expert evidence set out in detail in Re D [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) [57]. 
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status is to create a family rather than to represent biological reality, biology 
loses its moral superiority as a determining factor for legal parenthood.80 
As Bainham notes, the reforms instituted by HFEA 2008 ‘increase the 
circumstances…in which the social or intentional parent is treated in law as the 
parent’.81 This is evident in the way the 2008 Act allows a second female to 
automatically become a legal parent on the birth of the child or a second male to 
obtain a parental order to the same effect. Whilst this does nothing to promote 
the value of biological truth, it does give effect to the parties’ intentions, which is 
a value worth protecting in itself. Hill argues that ‘what is fundamental in 
rendering a biological progenitor a parent is not the biological tie itself, however, 
but the preconception intention and the preconception and postconception acts 
which the biological relation evinces’. 82  Therefore rather than promoting 
biological truth, which after all could be a matter for the birth certificate, legal 
parentage, in the context of assisted reproduction, is trying to afford recognition 
to those who intend to care for and raise the child. That is not to say that 
intention should replace biological connection in the ordinary course of 
reproduction because conception in that context is not always intended. 
However, in the context of ART where intention plays such a large role, it is in 
fact the intention of the commissioning couple that instigates the whole process, 
it seems appropriate to afford it greater legal recognition than the claims of 
biology. 
The role of intention and biology in determining legal parenthood is an issue that 
the Californian Supreme Court dealt with in Johnson v Calvert83  and In re 
Buzzanca.84 In Johnson, the appellant (Ms Johnson) sought a declaration that 
she was the mother of a child, which she gave birth to on the understanding that 
the parents of the child would be the respondents (Mr and Mrs Calvert). In this 
case Johnson was a gestational surrogate and was implanted with an embryo 
created by Mr Calvert’s Sperm and Mrs Calvert’s egg. Therefore the court had 
to resolve whether Mrs Calvert or Ms Johnson was the legal mother of the child. 
The Californian Uniform Parentage Age, provides that gestation may be a 
                                            
80  John Lawrence Hill. 'What Does it Mean to be a Parent--The Claims of Biology as the Basis 
for Parental Rights' (1991) 66 N Y U L Rev 353, 393. 
81  Andrew Bainham. 'Arguments about parentage' (2008) 67(2) Cambridge Law Journal 334. 
82  John Lawrence Hill. 'What Does it Mean to be a Parent--The Claims of Biology as the Basis 
for Parental Rights' (1991) 66 N Y U L Rev 353, 414. 
83  Johnson v Calvert (1993) 5 Cal 4th 84. 
84  In re Marriage of Buzzanca (1998) 72 Cal Rptr 2d, 282  
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ground for conferring legal motherhood,85 but does not make this a requirement. 
The court considered that a genetic relationship, such as that which existed 
between the child and Mrs Calvert, could be an alternative basis to gestation for 
conferring legal motherhood. In this case genetics and gestation pointed to two 
different women and the court felt that the intention of the parties was the best 
way to resolve the conflict, stating that: 
…although the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and 
giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child 
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one woman, 
she who intended to procreate the child – that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to 
raise as her own – is the natural mother under California law.86 
The importance of intention as a basis for determining legal parenthood was 
confirmed and extended in In re Buzzanca, which again concerned a gestational 
surrogacy but this time the child was not genetically related to the 
commissioning couple. The court extended the principle that a husband can 
become the lawful father of a child born through the artificial insemination of his 
wife by consenting to the procedure. They applied this principle to the 
commissioning couple concluding that they were the parents of the child 
because they had consented to the surrogacy arrangement as the intended 
parents.87 
These judicial decisions may seem to indicate a strong preference in favour of 
parties’ intentions determining legal parenthood in the context of assisted 
reproduction. However, the importance of these decisions is limited somewhat 
by the facts of the cases. In Johnson the court clearly used intention as a 
means of deciding between competing biological claims based on genetics and 
gestation. Although in Buzzanca the court extended this to apply to a situation 
where there were no competing biological claims, the parenthood was not 
contested by the surrogate and it was to avoid the conclusion that the child was 
legally parentless for the purposes of child support. It is uncertain whether 
intention alone would trump the genetic and gestational claim of a surrogate 
who asserted her claim to legal parenthood.   
                                            
85 Calfornian Family Code s 7610. 
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Schultz, however, argues in favour of a standalone notion of intention that would 
trump biological claims. She suggests that ‘bargained-for intentions [should be] 
determinative of legal parenthood’.88 She restricts this to the context of ART 
because of the greater role that intention plays. In her argument, this increased 
focus on intention in parenthood reflects the greater degree of choice that adults 
exercise in their intimate lives as compared with the past.89 She suggests that 
the socially constructed nature of parenthood and the importance society 
attaches to parent-child relationships gives the role of intention in determining 
legal parenthood particular social significance.90 A manifestation of this, she 
suggests, is that if intention were afforded a central role in allocating legal 
parenthood, ‘both the number and types of intention-based arrangements about 
parenthood would likely multiply’. 91  This she suggests ‘presses fundamental 
questions about whether parenthood is necessarily only a one man/one woman 
proposition’92 
2.5 Recognising Multiple Parents 
A diversity of parenting arrangements exist following ART, including those that 
intentionally involve multiple parents in raising the child.93 This leads on to a 
discussion of whether the law should recognise more than two legal parents, 
which, as in most jurisdictions, is not the case in California or in E&W. This 
issue has received both academic and judicial discussion recently. Julie 
Wallbank argues that ‘lesbian parents…adopt a wider range of strategies for 
parenting than is recognised as possible within the legal framework’.94 This is 
supported by Leanne Smith’s research involving interviews with lesbian couples 
with children, which suggests that these alternative family structures that lesbian 
families adopt could be instructive in deciding how parenthood should be 
allocated.95 
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A good illustration of this is the family arrangement that was at issue in the 
Canadian case of AA v BB.96 The case concerned a female same-sex couple (A 
and C) who asked a male friend (B) to be the biological father. Although A and 
C were to be the child’s primary caregivers, they still wanted B involved in the 
child’s life. Under the Canadian legislation, A, the biological mother, and B were 
considered the legal parents of the child. All parties, however, wanted C to be 
recognised as a legal parent but did not want to extinguish B’s status, which 
adoption would have done. The Ontario Supreme Court considered that it was 
in the child’s best interests that C was recognised as a legal parent and the only 
way to do this without extinguishing the biological father’s status was to 
recognise all three as legal parents, which the court did using their inherent 
jurisdiction.97This is a novel case because it recognised the validity of the 
arrangement that the family had set up, namely that the child should have three 
legal parents, despite the fact that the legislation only contemplated two.  
Whilst this has been the most progressive case, in that it is the only one that 
has made an outright declaration of parentage to three parties, there have been 
effectively similar, although perhaps more limited, outcomes in other 
jurisdictions. The U.S case of Shultz-Jacob,98 for example, concerned a similar 
co-parenting arrangement as AA v BB, which had broken down when the 
female same-sex couple separated. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania in that 
case recognised both the biological father and the mother’s female partner as 
parents for the purposes of child support obligations. The court stopped short of 
declaring all three parties as legal parents of the child as the court did in AA v 
BB. However, this is still a significant decision because the court recognises that 
the fact that all three were acting as de facto parents has, albeit limited, legal 
implications: 
if fundamental fairness prevents Appellant, identified by law as a 
third party, from avoiding a support obligation arising from her 
status as a de facto  parent, and she does not, in any event, 
attempt such an avoidance, does not the same principle operate 
similarly to estop Appellee Frampton, automatically recognized as 
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the possessor of parental rights based on his biological 
parenthood, from disclaiming financial responsibility?99 
The courts in E&W have similarly recognised that the involvement of more than 
two adults in a parental capacity can have legal implications for all the parties, 
without having taken that extra step the Ontario court took of recognising each 
party as a legal parent. This is greatly facilitated by the possibility, contained in 
the Children Act of granting parental responsibility orders.100 Unlike parental 
status this need not be limited to two individuals. Parental responsibility is 
defined as ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which by 
law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property’.101 The use of 
parental responsibility in co-parenting arrangements suggests a very function-
based, rather than status-based, approach to the issue. This is exemplified in 
the case of Re D,102 which concerned a female same-sex couple (A and C) who 
advertised for a man (B) to have a child (D) with and subsequently be involved 
in the child’s life. The biological mother (A) and father (B) are D’s legal parents. 
However C has parental responsibility as a result of a joint residence order. B’s 
contact with D had been limited by a previous court order because of his 
disruptive influence on the family unit. The court was being asked to award B 
parental responsibility, in addition to A and C, on the basis of undertakings that 
B would not interfere in Ds life in certain ways. The court was persuaded by 
these undertakings, which it made part of the order, and granted B parental 
responsibility in recognition of the important role that B played in D’s life. 
In Re D, the court were highly creative in their use of parental responsibility. As 
the court acknowledged, they were essentially conferring a status on the father 
as a result of the limitations they had placed on the order.103 This, however, 
does not seem to accord with the nature of parental responsibility, which is after 
all a function-based order. To limit parental responsibility in such a way in effect 
renders the concept devoid of meaning. It seems that what the father actually 
desired was to be recognised as a parent, which A and C refused to do because 
they believed this threatened their family unit. It seems that this could have 
been avoided if all three parties had been recognised as parents but perhaps 
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only A and C had been granted parental responsibility. In that way B would feel 
valued as a part of the child’s life and A and C would not feel threatened by B’s 
presence. It is quite telling that they wanted B to be considered the father but 
not a parent. In essence this suggests that they wanted B to have a formal 
status in relation to D but not to have the raft of rights and responsibilities in 
relation to D that A and C had. Given that all parties wanted B involved in D’s 
life, this could be phrased to the effect that A and C wanted B to be considered 
a parent alongside each of them but not to have parental responsibility as they 
did. As Dr Sturge commented in that case,104 perhaps it is more a case of not 
having the appropriate language for the situation.105 
Some argue that parental responsibility is adequate to recognise social 
parents.106 However this underplays the importance of the status of parenthood. 
Lowe contends that the family unit should enjoy ‘adequate and equal legal 
recognition’ whatever form it takes.107 In the context of gay/lesbian co-parenting 
projects, ‘adequate and equal legal recognition and protection’ means granting 
full parental status to those who all parties intend to be social parents to the 
child. The reason for this is that being considered a parent is an important part 
of being considered a member of the family. 108  As the court in AA v BB 
acknowledged, being considered a parent is not only important in terms of its 
legal effects (e.g. the right to inherit) but also its extra-legal effects such as a 
feeling of connection between the social parent and child.109 Therefore, whilst 
Bainham’s suggestion of merely allocating social parents parental responsibility 
may work on a pragmatic level, it does not allow gay and lesbian couples to 
create, through co-parenting projects, the type of family that would best reflect 
their underlying intentions.   
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Despite the increasing importance of equality discourse that has led to an 
increased acceptance of same-sex relationships, society’s fundamental 
assumptions in relation to the sexual family remain largely unchanged. As 
Fineman highlights: 
But these reforms merely reinforce the idea of the sexual family. 
By duplicating the privileged form, alternative relationships merely 
affirm the centrality of sexuality to the fundamental ordering of 
society and the nature of intimacy.110 
The suggestion here is that alternative families, although increasingly 
recognised in law, are having to conform to a legal framework that was not 
designed with them in mind and that operates on the basis of assumptions that 
may be fundamentally at odds with the type of families they are trying to create, 
including co-parenting arrangements. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Overall, therefore, the legislative framework in E&W and California seems to 
pursue the same ends, namely that the woman who gives birth to the child is 
the legal mother within a two-parent model where the father is such through 
biology or consent to ART treatment. Despite this, the courts in both 
jurisdictions have been creative in the allocation of parenthood to take into 
account the intentions of the parties. This has had the effect in E&W that third-
party donors, in addition to the legal parents, perform certain parental functions 
without being afforded full recognition as a legal parent through the use of 
parental responsibility orders. This adopts a very function-based approach to 
the allocation of parenthood. However, this overlooks the considerable 
significance the status of parent has in the formation of alternative family forms.  
It seems that the Californian courts, by focussing on the intention of the parties, 
have laid the foundation for the possibility of recognising multiple-parent families 
in the way that the Canadian courts already have. To a certain extent this 
approach has, in effect, been adopted by the courts of E&W through the use of 
parental responsibility orders. However, this fundamentally fails to recognise the 
importance of parental status in the creation of alternative family forms. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
The aim of the empirical research in this project was to explore why people hold 
the views they do about involving a gamete donor or surrogate in the lives of 
their children who were born using third-party assisted reproduction. More 
specifically the research project was designed to investigate the following 
research questions: what level of donor/surrogate involvement do people who 
have received ART desire? What are the reasons for this? What level of legal 
recognition would they afford the donor/surrogate? The intention was to gain a 
detailed understanding of the reasons and values that underpin attitudes 
towards donor/surrogate involvement in order to assess whether these are 
reflected in the legal regulation of parenthood following assisted reproduction.  
In order to address these research questions fully, it seemed appropriate to 
adopt a mixed methods approach. It was felt that the topic would benefit from 
combining a quantitative survey gathering generalisable data on social attitudes 
followed by an in-depth qualitative exploration of the motivations behind these 
views in order to provide a holistic view of the issue. This seems well suited to 
the research topic because, whilst a quantitative study can identify trends in 
attitudes, it is unlikely to be able to tease out the complex reasons that influence 
people’s attitudes in relation to this highly sensitive topic.111 Therefore, an in-
depth qualitative study of a smaller group of individuals seemed appropriate to 
complement the quantitative study. This has been done to good effect in other 
socio-legal studies.112 Although this was the original intention, the small sample 
size that was achieved, and is discussed in more detail below, meant that the 
results of the quantitative study could not be more broadly generalised as had 
been hoped if there had been more respondents. As a result of the iterative 
approach this study adopted between data collection and research design,113 
the latter was able to be adapted to accommodate this in response to the 
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emerging empirical data. In the end, the study did employ both quantitative and 
qualitative techniques to good effect. The quantitative survey served the dual 
purpose of providing a sampling frame for the interviews and also as an aid to 
forming the interview guide. This is seen as ‘one of the chief ways in which 
quantitative research can prepare the ground for qualitative research’114 and is 
discussed in more detail below. Although the scale of the study limits its 
potential impact, it did allow some important conclusions to be drawn. It also 
raised and clarified important questions that should be explored in further 
research, especially in relation to groups less represented in the achieved 
sample such as same-sex couples. 
It is important to be clear about the nature of the research and the knowledge 
produced by it. Despite the inclusion of both quantitative and qualitative 
techniques, this does not presuppose a particular epistemological outlook. This 
study rather attempts to adopt a research strategy that is best suited to 
answering the present research questions.115 The study does not attempt to 
collect scientifically verifiable data on the nature of a single social reality. It 
rather acknowledges the multiple perspectives of participants as they construct 
and interpret their social environment.116 Therefore, this study is influenced by 
social constructivism, which is premised on the notion that individuals create 
their own subjective meanings based on interaction with others and the various 
norms that operate in people’s lives.117 Rather than impose predefined theory 
on the research data, the study has attempted to develop and generate theory 
inductively based on the data gathered from research participants. That is not to 
say that data collection was approached with no preconceived theoretical 
framework. Concepts were derived from the literature review (e.g. tension 
between social and biological conceptions of parenthood, idea of entering co-
parenting arrangements) and used as sensitising concepts to inform the data 
                                            
114  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 619. 
For an example of how this was employed in a study on criminal offenders see Janet Jamieson, 
'Negotiating Danger in Fieldwork on Crime: A Researcher's Tale' in Stephanie Linkogle and 
Geraldine Lee-Treweek (eds), Danger in the field : risk and ethics in social research (Routledge, 
London 2000) 212. 
115See Hope Olsen. 'Quantitative "Versus" Qualitative Research: The Wrong Question' 
<http://www.ualberta.ca/dept/slis/cais/olson.htm> accessed 19 April 2011 accessed 4 
September 2011. 
116See Alfred Schutz, The problem of social reality (Nijhoff, The Hague 1962) 59. 
117  John W. Creswell, Qualitative inquiry and research design : choosing among five traditions 
(Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 1998) 21. 
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collection.118 However, in order to stand alongside the categories developed 
through data analysis, these sensitising concepts had to be reflected in the data 
gathered and gain purchase in that way rather than being imposed on the 
data.119 
In order to generate theory from data, this study has adopted a grounded theory 
approach. This has traditionally been associated with a positivist understanding 
of the social world.120 However, recently a constructivist version of grounded 
theory has been developed. 121  This draws on the traditional conception of 
grounded theory,122 in the sense that there is an inductive relationship between 
data and theory, the latter being generated on the basis of careful coding of the 
data. However, rather than doing this in order to ensure a rigorous 
representation of objective reality, the study emphasised the importance of the 
interpretations that both the participants and researcher brings to the data. In 
this sense researcher reflexivity is important.123 The values that the researcher 
brings to the research can be as important as those that the research 
participants bring.124Therefore the data that were collected was analysed on the 
basis of an interpretative theoretical framework that was explicit about the 
researcher’s critical stance to the current state of the law. 
3.2 Data Collection 
Sample 
This study sought to reflect a range of views of individuals who had made use of 
third party assisted reproduction because they were likely to have considered 
                                            
118  Barney G. Glaser, Theoretical sensitivity : advances in the methodology of grounded theory 
(Sociology Press, Mill Valley, Calif. 1978) 164. See also Glen Bowen. 'Grounded Theory and 
Sensitizing Concepts' (2006) 5(3) International Journal of Qualitative Methods 12. 
119  Kathy Charmaz, Constructing grounded theory (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 
2006) 16 - 17. 
120  Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The discovery of grounded theory : strategies for 
qualitive research (Observations, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London 1968) 271. 
121 See Kathy Charmaz, 'Grounded Theory in the 21st Century: Applications for Advancing 
Social Justice Studies' in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (eds), The SAGE handbook 
of qualitative research (3rd edn Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 2005) 1210 and 
Kathy Charmaz, Constructing grounded theory (Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 2006). 
122See Juliet M. Corbin and Anselm L. Strauss, Basics of qualitative research : techniques and 
procedures for developing grounded theory (3rd edn Sage Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, 
Calif. 2008) 379. 
123 For more on this see Samia Bano, ''Standpoint', 'Difference' and Feminist Research' in Reza 
Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Theory and method in socio-legal research (Oñati international 
series in law and society, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2005). 
124  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 24 - 
26. 
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issues surrounding donor/surrogate involvement. In order to obtain such a 
purposive sample, the project was advertised, with a link to an online 
questionnaire, on infertility and assisted reproduction online support groups both 
in the UK and US. In addition, key institutional contacts were identified within 
various support groups in the UK and both support groups and surrogacy 
agencies in the US in order to disseminate the call for participants more widely.  
The sample size that this project sought was between 15 - 20 respondents to 
the questionnaire in each jurisdiction with approximately one third consenting to 
a follow up interview. Ideally the sample would have a fairly even gender 
balance with the views of participants in both same-sex and different-sex 
relationships being represented. It soon became clear, however, that the 
majority of respondents were the female spouse of a (heterosexual) married 
couple. This is unsurprising given that females tend to participate in social 
research more readily125 and heterosexual couples form the bulk of patients 
treated using ART.126 This suggests that men and same-sex couples who have 
made use of ART are a harder to access groups. This study has adopted an 
iterative approach between data collection and research design, the latter of 
which has evolved in response to the empirical data. Therefore, in order to try to 
gain access to same-sex ART users, contact was made with LGBT charities 
and support groups such as Stonewall and parenting support groups, in order to 
try to recruit participants. In addition to this snowball sampling was used in order 
to increase the response rate whereby current participants were asked to pass 
on information of the study to anybody they know who might be interested in 
participating.127  
Due to the constrained time frame of eight weeks in which this study could be 
conducted, a sample of twenty responses to the online questionnaire was 
achieved, across both California and E&W. Of these nine participants agreed to 
be interviewed further by telephone. This included two males, two females in a 
                                            
125 Linda Sacks et al. ‘Assessing Response Rates and Non-Response Bias in Web and Paper 
Surveys’ (2003) 44(4) Research in Higher Education 409, 424 
126 According to HFEA Statistics, just over 2% of those treated using IVF or donor insemination 
in 2006 were same-sex couples. See 
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Latest_long_term_data_analysis_report_91-06.pdf.pdf> accessed 
5 September 2011. 
127 See Charles Teddlie and Fen Yu, ‘Mixed Method Sampling: A Typology with Examples’ 
(2007) 1(1) Journal of Mixed Methods Research 77. See also Jenifer Mason, Qualitative 
Researching (Sage, London 2002) 140. 
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same-sex relationship and the remainder of respondents to the online 
questionnaire were heterosexual females. Unexpectedly, two of the participants 
who completed the questionnaire and agreed to take part in the follow-up 
interview were from Canada. Given the legal developments in Canada, the 
research design was modified to include their participation. Therefore the data 
from these participants were analysed with the California data given the 
geographic proximity and also the Canadian legal position is more closely 
aligned with California than E&W. Although the sample that was achieved was 
not ideal, the valuable data gathered from the participants captures a range of 
views and does allow the study, at the very least, to pose insightful questions 
that deserve to be researched further. Further research in this area, for example, 
might meaningfully attempt to access the views of more same-sex couples and 
male partners on this issue. However, creative sampling strategies will have to 
be used for a more sustained period in order to access this difficult-to-access 
group, as this study has shown.128    
Data Collection Instruments  
In the first phase of the study, online questionnaires were used to identify 
participants’ attitudes towards donor/surrogate involvement. The online 
questionnaire129 was considered to be the most effective means of collecting 
data from as large a group of respondents as possible. It was also seen as a 
flexible instrument that facilitated the creation of likert scales and the use of filter 
questions.130Although the questionnaires did collect significant data, they were 
mainly used as a sampling frame for the semi-structured interviews and also as 
a means of developing follow-up questions to explore people’s views and 
experiences in more depth. In light of this, a representative sample was not 
sought because the findings were not intended to be generalisable to the 
population at large but rather to provide a snapshot of people’s experiences and 
views. 
In order to elicit participants’ views to particular family arrangements, vignettes 
were used. These presented situations involving donor and surrogate 
                                            
128 After the survey was taken down there were a number of participants who offered to take 
part. Therefore, a longer sample recruitment period would be desirable in future research. 
129 See appendix 1 
130  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 645. 
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involvement as well as the legal consequences of this.131 As Hughes highlights, 
vignettes are a particularly useful way of discussing sensitive topics because 
they present the question in a less direct and threatening way.132 Vignettes are 
advantageous not only in eliciting normative responses,133 which in this context 
might take the form of ascertaining what rights and responsibilities 
donors/surrogates should have, but they also help interviewees to contextualise 
responses.134  This was important in the current research project, as it was 
necessary to illustrate how the law operates in a given context, in order to 
ensure that participants understood the legal situation. What is more, the use of 
vignettes helped to make the scenario under discussion more concrete. 
The questionnaire was piloted on staff and PhD students in the School of Law at 
the University of Exeter some of whom were parents and though likely to be 
able to contextualise their views appropriately. An adapted version of the pilot 
questionnaire was then sent to institutional contacts within a Californian 
surrogacy agency in order to ensure that it was suitable for a Californian 
audience. Only minor changes were suggested to the questionnaire and 
interview guide. Therefore, it was felt that the perspective gathered during 
piloting was potentially significant comparator data for the study. This data were 
therefore analysed and included in the discussion. However, it has been made 
clear that these are the views of the educated layperson who have no actual 
experience with assisted reproduction technology. This however provides an 
interesting comparison with the actual sample of participants and is used as a 
means of enhancing the overall analysis where only a relatively low response 
rate from sought after participants was achievable in the timeframe imposed for 
this study.  
During the second phase of the project semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with all the participants who had agreed to a follow-up interview. 
Such interviews have been used to good effect in previous feminist research 
which has drawn on social constructivism135 and was seen as a good means of 
                                            
131 See questions 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 in appendix 1. 
132  Rhidian Hughes. 'Considering the Vignette Technique and its Application to a Study of Drug 
Injecting and HIV Risk and Safer Behaviour' (1998) 20(3) Sociology of Health and Illness 381. 
133  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 245. 
134  Christine Barter and Emma Renold. 'The  use of vignettes in qualitative research' (1999) 25 
Social Research Update . 
135 See e.g. Mary Allen. 'Violence and voice: using a feminist constructivist grounded theory to 
explore women's resistance to abuse' (2011) 11 Qualitative Research 23. 
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exploring in-depth the experiences of research participants.136 Semi-structured 
interviews are particularly suitable in the context of a research project influenced 
by constructivism because they can be very participant-driven137 and they allow 
participants to explore issues in their own way without having a structure 
artificially imposed on them by the researcher.138 Focus groups were considered. 
However, given the geographical spread of participants both in E&W and 
California, this did not seem a feasible option. In addition to this, semi-structured 
interviews are particularly well-suited to discussing personal decision making of 
the type explored in this study, especially when employing the vignette 
technique.139 
The interview guide 140  included open-ended questions which allowed the 
participants to expand on their answers. Possible prompting questions were 
also included in the schedule to ensure that participant’s opinions were solicited 
on specific issues if they did not volunteer that information. Interview transcripts 
were analysed shortly after the interview, as described in the data analysis 
section. Themes that began to emerge in earlier interviews were presented to 
participants in subsequent interviews for comment e.g. donor involvement 
potentially might be more desirable in same-sex couples. In this way new 
emerging ideas and themes could be explored more fully. 
Due to the sample’s geographic spread, the majority of interviews were 
conducted over the telephone. This has the disadvantage that non-verbal cues 
and body language cannot be observed which may have been useful. However, 
this is outweighed by the travel costs that are avoided by telephone interviewing 
and the likelihood that a telephone interview is a less distressing environment to 
answer sensitive questions than a face-to-face interview.141 All were digitally 
recorded and then transcribed. Although the initial intention was to conduct all 
the interviews over the telephone, the demands of empirical research often 
require rethinking methodology as a result of practical considerations. Some 
respondents were currently undergoing treatment cycles and indicated that they 
were unable to devote the time to a telephone interview but were happy to be 
                                            
136  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 437. 
137  Janet A.E. Creelman and Roma M. Harris. 'Coming Out: The Information Needs of Lesbians' 
(1993) 10(3) Collection Building 37. 
138  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 463. 
139  Ibid 448. 
140 See appendix 2. 
141  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 447. 
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interviewed via e-mail. Therefore telephone interviews were combined with e-
mail interviews, which have previously been done to good effect in qualitative 
research. 142  Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that there is little 
difference in the quality of responses between telephone and face-to-face 
interviewing.143 To a large extent this was true in the present study but there 
were some additional difficulties that had to be overcome in relation to the e-
mail interviews. 
One concern with asynchronous online interviewing such as this is that it can be 
quite protracted and respondents may drop out along the way.144 As it turned 
out, the respondents that requested e-mail interviews were highly motivated and 
passionate about the subject. Therefore the e-mail exchanges proved a rich 
source of data because the participants were able give more considered 
answers although there sometimes were quite long delays between responses. 
However, it was harder to elicit responses to hypothetical situations via e-mail 
than over the telephone because participants would often bring their responses 
back to their own situation. Despite suggestions that it is harder to maintain 
rapport with participants in online interviews compared to face-to-face 
interviews,145 there was a real sense of mutual trust developed in the e-mail 
exchanges that made participants feel comfortable expanding on their answers 
to sensitive questions in detail.146 This also meant that the interviewer could 
come back to certain points that were raised after having considered them and 
seek further elaboration. This was facilitated by the decision to send questions 
in small batches rather than all at once. 147  These benefits were seen as 
outweighing the various drawbacks. 
3.3 Data Analysis 
The information from the questionnaire was never intended to provide 
statistically representative data that could be generalised within a quantitative 
                                            
142  Sarah Nettleton and others, 'The Reality of Virtual Social Support' in Steve Woolgar (ed), 
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framework. Despite this, basic descriptive statistical analyses were carried out 
on the results from the questionnaire in order to indicate prevailing views within 
the sample and its demographics. This has been used to indicate general trends 
in attitudes although a more diverse sample may result in a broader range of 
views and that further research on this would be appropriate. The main purpose 
of the questionnaire, however, was to provide the basis for further data 
collection in the semi-structured interviews. Therefore the free text data in the 
questionnaire was coded in order to identify certain basic themes such as 
‘threatens family unit’ or ‘who am I to judge?’. These were then reflected in the 
interview questions to tease out each participant’s views in relation to these 
themes. In this way there was an iterative relationship between data analysis 
and collection with the former continuing alongside and informing subsequent 
data collection, as is consistent with grounded theory methodology.148 
In relation to the interviews, these were transcribed and systematically coded 
line-by-line, in accordance with the loose precepts of grounded theory, in an 
attempt to code only what was represented in the data rather than introducing 
predefined theory. This allowed emergent ‘in vivo’ concepts to appear.149 Whilst 
this was the aim, it is important to acknowledge that data analysis is conducted 
through the lens of the researcher’s own interpretations and as such does not 
attempt to be completely value-free.150 This coding was used as a platform to 
subsequently develop more abstract themes.151 Initial ‘in vivo’ codes, namely 
codes developed from the phrases used in the participants responses, that 
emerged in early interviews were presented to participants in subsequent 
interviews for comment. This allowed the development of selective codes and 
the emergence of broad themes.152 For example early ‘in vivo’ codes in relation 
to co-parenting included ‘what’s the point?’; ‘no additional benefit’; ‘It’s fine if it 
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works for them’. This allowed for the development of a broader theme, namely 
the distinction between personal preferences and external preferences.153 
3.4 Ethical Considerations154 
Fully informed consent was achieved through an online information sheet 
explaining the voluntary nature of the project, including the ability to withdraw at 
any time, and consent form, which had to be accepted before completing the 
questionnaire.155 Confidentiality was ensured, as far as possible, by the use of 
pseudonyms when discussing the empirical data in order to protect participants’ 
identities.156 In terms of data protection, interview transcripts and the results of 
the questionnaire were anonymised and securely stored, separately from 
participants’ details.157  
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154 The research was guided by the Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLSA) Statement of 
Principles of Ethical Research Practice (2009) 
155 See appendix 1. 
156 See appendix 3 for a table of the jurisdiction, which each participant came from in order to 
facilitate easy comparison. 
157 This was done in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and the University of Exeter, 
School of Law’s Ethical Checklist. 
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4. Donor/Surrogate Involvement 
4.1 Introduction 
This study has adopted as its starting point the premise that co-parenting 
arrangements158 exist in the context of ART and that there is a lack of uniformity 
in their legal recognition.159 The form such legal regulation should take is a 
complex and multi-faceted issue that would require detailed research into the 
various forms of co-parenting arrangements that exist as well as consideration 
of other legal and ethical factors.160 The present study does not suggest that 
legal regulation should depend solely on the views of the people concerned. 
Given the diversity of legal approaches to such arrangements, however, it is 
important to canvass opinion, from a number of jurisdictions, on a topic of such 
social significance as this.161 Despite certain limitations in the sample that was 
achieved, 162  the study has gathered a range of views on donor/surrogate 
involvement, from participants in both California and E&W who had made use of 
ART and therefore were particularly concerned by these issues. The current 
chapter will explore views in relation to donor/surrogate involvement and the 
motivations behind this, in response to the first two research questions. The 
following chapter will then consider perceptions in relation to the adequacy of 
legal recognition, in response to the final research question.163  
4.2 Co-parenting 
Although the notion of the existence of co-parenting arrangements, derived from 
the literature, underpins this study, no assumption is made about the desirability 
of such arrangements. The study attempts to assess the viability/desirability of 
                                            
158 See Deborah Dempsey, ‘Conceiving and Negotiating Reproductive Relationships: Lesbians 
and Gay Men Forming Families with Children’ (2010) 44 Sociology 1145 for a discussion of the 
different types of arrangements that exist. In this study, co-parenting refers to a significant 
degree of donor/surrogate involvement in the child’s life. 
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however, would benefit from considering such ethical and legal issues as the best interest of the 
child versus the legal equality of the parents. 
161 For more detailed discussion of the social significance of this area of research see Chapter 
2: Literature Review pp 13 – 15. 
162 The sample and its limitations are discussed more fully in Chapter 3: Methodology at pp 30 – 
31. 
163 The aim and research questions of this study are set out more fully in Chapter 3: 
Methodology at p 27. 
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these arrangements for the participants of this study without assuming their 
existence. Therefore, whilst the concept of co-parenting arrangements is used 
to structure the questions in this study, this is not externally imposed on them 
but rather gains purchase in the research through participants’ own use of the 
concept, as is consistent with grounded theory methodology.164 
In order to achieve this, one of the aims of this study was to investigate the level 
of donor and surrogate involvement that individuals who had made use of third-
party assisted reproduction would want in their children’s lives. This was 
explored in the online questionnaire, where participants were given various 
options about how much they would want a donor, traditional surrogate and 
gestational surrogate involved. 165 The results of these questions are displayed 
graphically below to allow for easy comparison between the jurisdictions (see 
figures 1 – 3).166 In each of the graphs below the views of the pilot group are 
represented in order to provide an interesting comparison between individuals 
who approach this from a purely theoretical point of view and those who have 
actually been involved in the process.167 
Figure 1: Donor Involvement 
 
                                            
164 For a more detailed discussion of this see Chapter 3: Methodology pp 27 – 29. 
165 See questions 3, 6 and 8 in appendix 1. 
166 In order to facilitate graphical representation, strongly agree and agree are represented as 
one variable (agree), and strongly disagree and disagree are represented as disagree. 
167This was not possible in relation to gestational surrogates because this question was 
introduced after the piloting phase of the study. 
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Figure 2: Traditional Surrogate Involvement 
 
Figure 3: Gestational Surrogate Involvement 
 
 
From the graphs, it is interesting to note that there is a broad consensus 
between all three groups (pilot group, participants from E&W and participants 
from California) that they would not consider engaging in a co-parenting 
arrangement. One explanation for this is the seeming rarity of this type of 
intentional co-parenting arrangement amongst heterosexual couples. 168 
Therefore, perhaps it is to be expected that the majority of participants would 
resist this type of arrangement. As Dianne, a single woman from E&W, 
commented during the interview: 
Traditionally and because of my upbringing in the UK, I’m not used 
to the ‘having more than two parents’ scenario. So to me it seems 
                                            
168 Whilst there is little statistical information about this, studies have suggested that these types 
of arrangements are specifically sought within the gay community to an extent that is not 
present amongst heterosexual couples. See for example Susan Hogben and Justine Coupland 
‘Egg Seeks Sperm. End of Story…? Articulating Gay Parenting in Small Ads for Reproductive 
Partners’ (2000) 11(4) Discourse and Society 459, 462 
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unfamiliar. That might influence why I’m quite against the three-
way parenting system. 
This view, that co-parenting is ‘not for us’, seems to be reflected across all the 
groups. This may, however, be a reflection of the demographics of the groups, 
in that the majority of the participants were married heterosexuals, to whom 
such an arrangement may not appeal perhaps because of the desire to 
perpetuate the public assumption that the child was conceived naturally in a 
way that is not possible for same-sex couples.169 As Connie, a married woman 
from E&W with two daughters born using donor sperm, remarked, ‘I couldn’t 
really see heterosexual couples wanting to enter into that kind of agreement. It 
would be like bringing someone else into your marriage really’. This is a 
comment echoed by a number of participants. For example, Annabel, a married 
woman from California with one child born using IVF with her and her husband’s 
own embryo, commented that ‘heterosexual couples are maybe more on the 
traditional (we’re not going to do that. That’s crazy thinking)…’ 
At this stage of the analysis, the weight of the evidence from participants 
suggests that heterosexual couples are not likely to consider entering into a co-
parenting arrangement with the donor/surrogate for themselves perhaps 
because of traditional thinking or perhaps because they don’t see any need to 
do so. As Eric, a single man from E&W highlighted, ‘if the child has got a father 
and a mother in a couple…I don’t so much see the need for an extra father in 
that child’s life’. However, this does not necessarily reflect the views of all 
heterosexual couples. There may well be heterosexual couples that would want 
to engage in some sort of co-parenting project. As Carmen, a married woman 
from California currently undergoing treatment with donor eggs, noted: 
I think it’s more of a possibility to have that kind of relationship if 
it’s a known donor and same if it is a lesbian or a heterosexual 
couple, if they know the donor and the donor is someone very 
close to them or in their family then I think there is a natural 
relationship that is already established because they are already 
in each other’s lives. 
In Carmen’s opinion it has less to do with whether it is a same-sex or different-
sex couple undergoing treatment but rather whether they are involving a friend 
                                            
169 As Eric commented, ‘it’s more about pretending, carrying on as though the social parents are 
the real parents.’   
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or family member in that process. This point seems to be crucial because none 
of the participants were actually using a friend as donor or surrogate. All of the 
participants for whom this was relevant had gone down the route of using a 
previously unknown donor or surrogate. 
4.3 Known Donor Involvement 
The fact that none of these participants had gone down the route of using a 
known donor/surrogate is significant because in many cases they had 
considered this option but decided against it in the end. Vinnie, a married man 
from Canada with three children conceived using donor sperm, rejected the 
offer of sperm from his father and brother because he didn’t want to complicate 
the social relationships, ‘they say money destroys friendships. Well I imagine 
children would destroy them even more’. Tammy, a married woman in California 
who is currently undergoing IVF with donor eggs, was all set to accept the offer 
of egg donation from one of her best friends until she realised the potential for 
conflict further down the line: 
The therapist had asked the question if something happened to 
my husband and me what did she [egg donor friend] think should 
happen to the child…our response was that if something 
happened to both of us which is highly unlikely, our child would 
probably live with one of our sister and our family and she said 
don’t you think it should be with its biological mother and I said 
technically I’d be the biological mother and that’s when I realised 
there was the red flag. So we knew going into it that she would 
have more of a vested interest in our child. 
In the same vein as Vinnie’s response there is a definite sense that one of the 
major reasons Tammy didn’t go down the route of using a friend as donor is that 
she didn’t want to ruin that friendship. She stresses that ‘she’s a big important 
part of my life so I would expect her to be a big important part of my child’s life. I 
wouldn’t want to lose her as a friend because we shared something intimate, 
her genetic material’. These are the experiences of people who were faced with 
the very real possibility of using a known donor and had to make a decision 
about whether to accept that or not. For other participants the issue was 
whether or not to approach a friend about being the donor/surrogate. 
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Based on the analysis of question 1,170 the majority of the participants in each of 
the three groups do not consider themselves likely to involve a friend as the 
donor.171 Conversely, the majority of participants in each jurisdiction do consider 
themselves likely to use an anonymous donor. Whilst the majority of participants 
in E&W are most likely to use anonymous donors, the data also reveals a split 
in opinion in relation to using known donors. It is interesting that roughly half of 
the participants in each jurisdiction believe it is at least possible that they would 
consider a friend as a donor even though three quarters maintain that it’s 
possible or likely they would use an anonymous donor. This seems to indicate 
that whilst many of these participants are open to the possibility of involving a 
friend as the donor, there is a clear preference for donors where there is no 
personal connection. 
Figure 4: Type of Donor 
 
Figure 5: Type of Surrogate 
 
                                            
170 See appendix 1 for the question. 
171 see figure 4 below. 
 
P = Pilot Group; EW  = England and Wales group; CA = California group 
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A number of reasons for this reluctance to use friends as known donors and 
engage in co-parenting projects with them emerged during the interviews. One 
theme that was reflected in a number of participants’ responses was that their 
position and role as a parent would be threatened by the heavy involvement of 
the donor in the child’s life. As Carmen (CA) commented, ‘I’d feel so threatened 
as a mother that this child will one day look at me and say that you’re not even 
the mom and how hurtful that will be because I am the mom in every single way’. 
Therefore, in a situation involving egg donation, the mother would feel 
threatened by donor involvement because it may diminish the significance of 
her role in the child’s life. This would also seem to be a concern for fathers in 
relation to sperm donors. As Eric (E&W) highlights, ‘I can’t help feeling that if 
there was another father then that would make me less of a father and make my 
role in that child’s life slightly less significant.’ Some participants did not feel 
quite the same level of threat from donor involvement but rather the presence of 
a constant reminder that the child was not biologically theirs. As Connie (E&W) 
remarked: 
I think there are certain things that you can compartmentalise and 
almost shut away in your brain if there’s not someone else who 
you would perhaps consider a father to your child around when it’s 
someone you don’t know a lot about. 
These ideas of donor involvement constituting a threat and constant reminder 
focus very much on the effect donor involvement would have on the intended 
parents. Participants were also conscious of the detrimental effect donor 
involvement might have on the child. It’s possible that this is felt more strongly 
amongst heterosexual couples where there may be an element of competition in 
parenting roles.172 
There was a sense that the parents’ feeling that their roles were diminished by 
donor involvement might have the undesirable effect of confusing the child and 
leading to a degree of competition for the child’s affections. Eric makes the point 
that ‘if it was my really good friend, I can see us almost being in competition and 
vying for that child’. This is supported by Connie’s suggestion that ‘with a known 
donor there could be a lot of emotional complications and blurred lines’. Sonia, 
a married woman from California who is currently undergoing treatment with an 
                                            
172 As Eric commented in the context of same-sex relationships, ‘I’d be inclined to think that the 
father would play a slightly different role to the mothers so there would be less competition.’ 
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anonymous egg donor, puts the case more strongly, stating that ‘it complicates 
child raising goals, confuses a child and could possibly create authority issues, 
especially when the donor does not share the same views as my husband and I 
do’. This study, limited as it was by time constraints, has focused primarily on 
the views of parents. However, future research might meaningfully be 
conducted into the views of children conceived using ART, which seem to be 
underrepresented in much of the research.173 
Based on the responses to the questionnaire it seems, therefore, that the 
majority of these participants, most of whom are married females, would prefer 
to use an anonymous donor and certainly do not want to engage in any sort of 
co-parenting project or have the donor heavily involved in their children’s lives. 
Judging by the interview data it seems that there are various reasons for this 
which appear to belong to three broad categories: the desire not to ruin existing 
social relationships; the negative feelings donor involvement would engender for 
the parents; and the detrimental effect such an arrangement might have on the 
child. Whilst these results cannot be treated as representative of heterosexual 
couples, there is a definite suggestion from a number of participants that co-
parenting arrangements do not seem a very realistic possibility for such 
couples.174 This is an interesting finding in itself and raises the question of 
whether such arrangements might be more desirable and feasible for same-sex 
couples. 
This research study could not form any concrete conclusions on the desirability 
and feasibility of co-parenting arrangements for same-sex couples. In order to 
do this a larger sample of same-sex couples would be required, preferably 
including couples that were currently engaging in co-parenting projects. 
However, some of the findings of this study do indicate that this would be a 
                                            
173 See for example Leanne Smith. 'Is Three a Crowd: Lesbian Mothers' Perspectives on 
Parental Status in Law' (2006) 18(2) Child and Family Law Quarterly 231, where interviews 
were conducted with Lesbian mothers in order to conclude that the law did not adequately 
recognise their rights and responsibilities. See also Deborah Dempsey, ‘Conceiving and 
Negotiating Reproductive Relationships: Lesbians and Gay Men Forming Families with Children’ 
(2010) 44 Sociology 1145, 1160 where the author states: ‘One question left begging is the 
extent to which children of different ages experience and understand these reproductive 
relationships.’ 
174 Thinking in relation to ART families seems to be different from thinking in relation to adoption 
where maintaining links with the birth parents and wider families is encouraged. See Jonathan 
Herring, Family law (Longman law series, 5th edn Longman, Harlow 2011) 685 – 7. In addition, 
continued relationships with the birth parents appear to be more common for adopted children. 
See Department of Health, Adoption and Permanence Taskforce Second Report (DoH, London 
2002) 15.  
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profitable area of further research. Firstly, there was a suggestion from the 
participants in this study that such arrangements might be a more realistic 
possibility for same-sex couples. As Connie highlights, 
The only way I can see where [co-parenting] would make a 
difference and people would perhaps feel that’s a beneficial thing 
to do is where it’s perhaps a same-sex couple and they wanted 
the child to have a father figure or role model.  
Perhaps even more telling is the comment from Anne-Marie, a female from 
Canada in a civil-partnership with 2 children born using anonymous donor 
sperm with identity release. She suggests that ‘I would have been open to donor 
involvement but my partner wasn’t. Therefore as a couple we were against 
donor involvement’. This is the first suggestion that donor involvement would be 
desirable in the concrete setting of the participant’s life rather than in response 
to a hypothetical scenario. However, it does highlight that the responses of 
same-sex couples are not necessarily likely to be as homogenous on this issue 
as perhaps the views of the present participants were. In any event, from the 
results of this study, it appears that further research might fruitfully be 
conducted into the views of same-sex couples in relation to donor involvement 
and every attempt should be made to ensure an appropriate gender balance 
between male and female same-sex couples is achieved.   
4.4 Surrogate Involvement 
Interestingly there appears to be a greater reluctance to involve friends as 
surrogates (both traditional and gestational)175 than there is in relation to donors. 
A chi-square test 176  was conducted in relation to question 4 177  and this 
confirmed that the difference was statistically significance. The P value was 
below the usual threshold for social science research178 (P<0.05) in both cases, 
namely P = 0.007 in relation to traditional surrogates and P = 0.02 in relation to 
gestational surrogates. This suggests that the difference is more significant in 
relation to traditional surrogates than gestational surrogates. Interestingly there 
is no statistically significant difference between the views of each of the groups 
in relation to using friends as donors (P = 0.782), traditional surrogates (0.953) 
                                            
175 Traditional surrogates use their own egg, whereas gestational surrogates use the intended 
mother’s egg or a donor egg.  
176 See appendix 4 for the contingency tables resulting from this test. 
177 See appendix 1. 
178  Alan Bryman, Social research methods (3rd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 335. 
 46 
and gestational surrogates (P = 0.615). Whilst the results of these tests are 
interesting and do indicate differences, statistically speaking they do not achieve 
valid significance because in all cases the number of count values below 5 
exceeds the 20% maximum for this test.179 This is largely due to the small 
sample size. Therefore, these results could be confirmed by further research in 
this area that was able to recruit a larger sample size. As a result, any 
conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis remain tentative although further 
exploration in the qualitative analysis of the interviews will provide additional 
insight into the reasons behind the responses to the questionnaire. 
The data gathered from the interviews can help to explain why there might be a 
greater reluctance to involve a friend as a surrogate than as a donor. A number 
of participants indicated that using a friend as a surrogate would be more 
complicated than using a friend as a donor. Sonia highlights the concern that: 
‘surrogates have a more emotional connection with the child since 
they gave birth to him/her. Known surrogates could potentially be 
even worse if they are overcome with emotional connection to the 
child and know who we are, where we live and has access to the 
child’.  
The suggestion here is that the reluctance to use a friend as a surrogate is 
affected by the sense that there is a greater connection between surrogate and 
child than there is between donor and child. This is reflected in Connie’s 
statement that ‘with traditional surrogacy, it feels different because that person 
is the genetic and birth mother of the child. It feels more like adoption to me and 
I guess legally it is. I think that’s why I would have different feelings about it’. 
In addition to the greater emotional connection, and perhaps in a way related to 
it, another factor that influences the reluctance to use friends as surrogates is 
the reluctance to use surrogacy in general. Based on the results of the 
questionnaire, a greater number of participants indicated that it was at least 
possible if not likely that they would not consider surrogacy than those who 
indicated the same in relation to sperm donation.180 This is perhaps because the 
vast majority of participants had undergone treatment using donor sperm, 
whereas only a very small minority had used a surrogate. Therefore, it may well 
be the case that the results would differ if the sample included more people who 
                                            
179  Ibid 335. 
180 See figure 5 above. 
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had used surrogacy. This seems to be borne out by the greater number of 
individuals in the pilot group, for whom this was a hypothetical scenario, who 
consider it at least possible, if not likely, that they would not use sperm donation 
compared to the groups who had actually undergone the treatment.181 
Nevertheless, there is a sense amongst some of the current participants that 
surrogacy presents additional complications which makes them less likely to 
consider this option and in turn would make them feel that using a friend as a 
surrogate would be an undesirable option. Dianne (E&W) comments that 
‘surrogate involvement presents slightly different issues because it’s a woman, 
especially if they are genetically related and they carried the child. I don’t think 
I’d ever use that method or even consider it’. For Eric, the difficulty seems to be 
more of a moral one that is created by the presence of the surrogate: 
It’s not really right what we’re doing because that child should be 
with his or her mother and we shouldn’t really cut that mother out. 
If it’s an anonymous person who doesn’t want anything to do with 
the child then I’m not in that position and it’s not an issue. 
Perhaps this adds to the sense that surrogacy is seen as somehow not well 
accepted in society, which may have an impact on participants views. As Kathy, 
a married woman from E&W who has a child using a traditional surrogate, 
comments, I have pics etc. to show Molly when she is older and of course we 
will not keep anything from her, I am hoping that surrogacy might be more 
acceptable by then!’ 
Despite this, the view that known surrogate involvement presents unique issues 
compared to known donor involvement is not universally accepted. Based on 
the results from the questionnaire it can be seen that the views of participants in 
California do not differ in relation to known surrogate involvement as compared 
to known donor involvement.182 In response to the question whether surrogate 
involvement presents similar or different issues as donor involvement, 183 
Annabel’s (CA) answer was ‘just the same. Absolutely the same. I don’t think 
that just because you were pregnant and with the child for 9 months that makes 
you any more involved than a sperm donor.’ 
                                            
181 See figure 4 above. 
182 See figures 1 and 2 above 
183 Question 3 a. See interview guide in appendix 2.  
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It is interesting to note that the results from the questionnaire indicate that in 
general participants from E&W see some surrogate involvement as more 
desirable than some donor involvement, whereas participants from California 
feel the same about both.184 One possible explanation for this is the different 
legal and social context of these two jurisdictions. In California, surrogacy is 
perhaps seen as more acceptable with commercial surrogacy being permitted. 
In E&W, however, commercial surrogacy is not allowed and HFEA regulated 
clinics are not permitted to assist in finding a surrogate. In addition to this, the 
law in California recognises the intention of the intended couple to a greater 
extent. This has resulted in the intended couple being considered the parents of 
the child rather than the surrogate. As discussed in chapter two, however, in 
E&W, this is not possible without a court order. Perhaps then participants in 
California feel just as comfortable excluding the donor as they do the surrogate 
because that is culturally and legally accepted there whereas here surrogacy 
laws have not necessarily developed in that way. This is something that will be 
considered in more depth in the following chapter. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Overall, therefore, this group of participants were quite resistant to the idea of 
co-parenting in relation to their own families. However, many of the participants 
indicated that it may well be a realistic possibility for other families, particularly 
those who are willing to use a known donor. Further research is therefore 
required, in relation to same-sex couples in particular, but also in respect of 
single parents by choice because their decisions to involve or exclude the donor 
could be instructive and provide a useful point of comparison. Surrogate 
involvement seems to present different issues, for participants in E&W at least, 
than donor involvement does. Therefore, further research into the views of 
those who have made use of surrogacy would provide greater insight into this. 
There does not appear to be such difference in opinion among Californian 
participants and one potential explanation for this may be the different cultural 
and legal recognition of surrogacy in these two jurisdictions. This chapter has 
focussed on participants’ views in relation to donor and surrogate involvement in 
the child’s life. The following chapter will now consider how this should be 
reflected in the law of parenthood. 
                                            
184 See figures 1 and 2 above. 
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5. Legal Recognition 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explored the first two research questions, namely the 
desired level of donor/surrogate involvement and the reasons for this. This 
chapter will focus on the final research question, namely how the law should 
regulate donor/surrogate involvement through the law of parenthood. In order to 
do this, the questionnaire presented the legal consequences of using a known 
donor and surrogate through the use of vignettes. 185  The results of these 
questions are displayed graphically below.186 
Figure 6: Legal Recognition of Known Donor 
 
Figure 7: Legal Recognition of Traditional Surrogate 
 
                                            
185 See questions 2 and 5 in appendix 1. 
186 See figures 6 – 8. 
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Figure 8: Legal Recognition of Gestational Surrogate 
 
5.2 Known Donor 
Based on the results of the questionnaire, it would seem that the vast majority of 
participants in each group are against granting a known donor default rights in 
the absence of agreement from all parties.187 There is unanimity on this point 
amongst Californian participants and the vast majority of the pilot group and 
participants from E&W seem to feel the same way. Interestingly, this does not 
lead to such a strong majority in either jurisdiction feeling that the donor should 
have no rights whatsoever in relation to the child. In fact, the majority of the pilot 
group disagree that the donor should have no rights in relation to the child. One 
might hypothesise from the results of the questionnaire that the discrepancy 
between the pilot group and other jurisdictions could be as a result of the former 
approaching it from a more hypothetical and perhaps idealised point of view 
without having fully thought through the implications of their views. One might 
also suggest that the reason there is not such a strong majority in favour of 
giving the donor no rights as there was in relation to not considering him an 
equal parent is because some middle ground is envisaged. One of the 
limitations of survey research, however, is that it provides no basis for 
confirming any of this speculation. In order to explore the motivations behind 
these interesting differences the interview data need to be examined. 
                                            
187 See figure 6. 
 
P = Pilot Group; EW  = England and Wales group; CA = California group 
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One of themes that emerged quite strongly in a number of participants’ 
responses was the idea that the child should be able to dictate the terms of the 
relationship when he or she is old enough to be able to make that decision. As 
Carmen (CA) commented:  
If the child would like the opportunity to meet their donor after they 
were 18 and the donor was willing to meet the child, I would not 
feel that I have control over that. I would make the information 
available if the child wanted to meet the donor 
This notion of transparency in order to facilitate any relationship the child might 
want with the donor in the future is reflected in the answers of a number of 
participants. Connie (E&W), for example, stresses that:  
I do feel strongly that children who are donor conceived should 
have the right to know how they were conceived… If they wanted 
to I wouldn’t discourage them from looking into the donor and it’s 
up to the child what form that relationship takes. 
There was no suggestion that there would be any secrecy surrounding how the 
child was conceived. Participants felt quite strongly about that, which is 
illustrated by Tammy’s suggestion that she is ‘all for transparency and honesty’. 
Perhaps, therefore, the need to be open with the child and preserve the 
possibility of a relationship with the donor in the future, if the child desires it, 
influences these participants’ views in relation to the rights a known donor 
should have. This issue seems to have been more prominent in relation to 
surrogacy and will, therefore, be discussed more fully in the following section. 
The desire for transparency and the possibility of a future relationship may 
partially explain the reduction in the majority of those in favour of granting no 
rights whatsoever to the known donor compared with the larger majority in 
favour of no defaults rights for the donor. These opinions may be felt more 
strongly in the pilot group or at least are not tempered by having had to actually 
face and address these issues. These issues are, however, also somewhat 
theoretical even for the participants in the two jurisdictions because none of 
them are actually in a situation involving a known donor. Despite this, there is a 
suggestion from some participants that if they were faced with this situation they 
would not wish the donor to have any default legal rights as a parent but at the 
same time they would not wish to cut them out completely. The desire to seek 
some kind of middle ground is evident in the comments made by Julie, a 
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married woman from E&W with two children conceived using an anonymous 
egg donor, in response to a hypothetical situation involving a known donor: 
I would also want to tell the child at a very early age, so that it 
seemed natural. We would have to find a way of balancing a 
complex situation, allowing [our friend] information and possibly a 
relationship, maybe as if an Uncle. 
An additional explanation for not wanting to cut a known donor out legally could 
be that it would not be in the child’s best interests. Susan, a female from E&W in 
a same-sex relationship, explains her reluctance to deny a known donor any 
legal rights in the following terms: 
I think it is extremely important for a child to know who they are 
and where they are from and whilst having a father figure may 
cause some difficulty between myself and my partner I still believe 
this would be in the child’s best interest. 
This concern may be particularly relevant for same sex couples.188 However, 
further research would have to be undertaken in order to confirm this. 
There seems to be a number of explanations for the significant proportion of 
participants that are reluctant to legally cut the donor out completely – the desire 
for transparency, the urge to protect future relations, the hope of finding some 
middle ground and the belief that it may not be in the best interest of the child. 
Despite this, there appears to be a general consensus amongst all the groups 
that a known donor should not be afforded the legal recognition of a parent 
when there is a lack of agreement between all parties. One theme that has 
emerged quite strongly in the data is the idea of overcomplicating an already 
complicated situation. As Tammy highlights  
Raising a child with my husband who I’ve known for 10 years is 
challenging enough…if I had a third person involved in the 
process I just think that would be really confusing and complicated 
especially if it was someone they knew. 
As a result of this, there is a suggestion that legal recognition of the donor could 
cause too many problems in raising the child. As Kathy comments: 
I definitely would not like any legal relationship, too many 
parents!...I really feel there could be problems that arise later on 
                                            
188 As Eric notes, ‘in the case of a female lesbian couple, I would be more inclined to say the 
father should have more rights because he is the child’s only father’. 
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regarding the child's upbringing etc. as the saying goes too many 
cooks spoil the broth! 
Therefore, this sense that granting a known donor equal parental rights or even 
any significant rights might complicate the raising of the child is a major factor in 
these participants’ reluctance to afford a known donor legal recognition. 
A number of participants elaborated on the different ways that the complications 
of involving three people in the raising of a child could manifest themselves. 
One suggestion is that the child could play parents off against each other, and 
although this can occur in two-parent families, it may be exacerbated when 
three people are involved. As Dianne commented,  
I think if you give the sperm donor some sort of rights or 
involvement in the upbringing of the child it could cause problems 
for the child. I can imagine that if the child didn’t get what he or 
she wanted from his social parents that he might go to his 
biological father and try to use the situation. 
This in turn could lead to confusion in the child’s mind as to which adult 
performs which role in his or her life which could have a detrimental effect on 
the environment in which the child is being raised. This is a factor that fed into 
Vinnie’s decision not to use a known donor. As he notes, ‘one of the reasons we 
decided against a friend/family donor was to avoid complicating the parenting 
roles’. This notion of confusing the child resonates in the answer of a number of 
participants. Kathy, for example, stresses that ‘The surrogate/donor being 
legally recognised could lead the child into confusion “who is Mummy” or “who 
is Daddy”’. 
The potential complication and confusion in relation to raising the child and 
performing parental roles certainly appear to have influenced many of the 
participants’ views against recognising the donor in any legal way. It would 
seem that participants’ views against legal recognition correspond to their lack 
of desire to have the donor involved in the child’s life, which was discussed in 
the previous chapter. In order to confirm this, a Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
test was conducted which confirmed that there is a strong negative correlation 
between the likelihood of heavily involving the donor in the child’s life and the 
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level of agreement that the donor should have no legal rights.189 This would 
suggest that the more likely participants are to consider involving the donor in 
the child’s life, the less likely they are to believe that the donor should have no 
legal rights. This conclusion, however, must remain tentative given the small 
sample size. Further research, particularly involving participants who are likely 
to approve of donor involvement, would be required to confirm this.   
The majority of these participants would be unlikely to consider allowing a 
known donor to be involved in the child’s life to any great extent and 
consequently feel that the donor should not have any legal rights. Despite this, 
there is a definite sense that, if the intended parents and donor want to reach an 
agreement on the level of involvement and legal recognition of the donor, this 
should be allowed to happen. According to figure 6, views are fairly evenly split 
as to whether the donor should or should not be afforded legal recognition if 
everyone is agreeable. One explanation for this is the absence of what Ronald 
Dworkin termed hostile external preferences, namely a preference restricting 
the assignment of goods or opportunities to others. This can be contrasted with 
personal preferences, which is a preference in relation to one’s own enjoyment 
of certain goods or opportunities.190 There seems to be a broad consensus 
amongst these participants that, as a matter of personal preference, co-
parenting/heavy donor involvement is not for them, but as a matter of external 
preference, people should be free to decide the level of donor involvement and 
the legal recognition that attaches to that. This is summed up by Connie’s 
comment, reflected in the answers of a number of participants, that ‘if parties 
involved wanted it to be that way, who am I to say that’s the wrong thing to do?’ 
Some, such a Dianne, conclude from this that the law, therefore, should not 
impose a restriction to two parents on those families who desire more: 
I don’t think that’s the laws place...I think there are scenarios 
where that wouldn’t work long term but I think there are certainly 
circumstances where I think it can work very well and the child is 
loved by three people instead of two which can’t be a bad thing... 
                                            
189 The correlation coefficient was -0.6, which is considered to indicate a strong negative 
correlation because it falls between -1 and -0.5. In addition this test would be statistically 
significant because the significance level is p=0.01, which is below the accepted level of 0.05. 
190  Ronald Dworkin, Taking rights seriously (Duckworth, London 1977) 234. 
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Carmen would seem to agree that donors should be afforded legal rights if all 
parties agree but remains firm on the point that this should not lead to default 
recognition of their rights: 
I do think that the law should recognise if all parties are in 
agreement that there is some kind of co-parenting relationship but 
I don’t think it should be something that is just a flat out law 
because I think that just makes it messy for couples who want a 
known donor but don’t want any co-parenting done. 
This view is fairly representative of the opinion of the majority of the participants 
in relation to known donors. There is also a degree of parity between the views 
of participants from E&W and those from California. The legal recognition of 
known surrogates, however, seems to cause a greater divergence of opinion, 
which will now be explored in some depth.     
5.3 Known Surrogate 
Based on the results of the survey, participants in both California and E&W 
have broadly similar opinions in relation to default rights for donors, traditional 
surrogates and gestational surrogates, namely that they are largely against 
them having any default rights.191 In addition, there is a very similar split in 
opinion in relation to granting the donor rights if everyone is agreeable regarding 
traditional surrogates, as was observed above in relation to donors. Therefore, 
participants in E&W are generally less resistant to the surrogate having some 
rights if everyone is agreeable than participants in California, as was the case 
with donors. As was discussed above in relation to donors, participants’ views 
that a known surrogate should be able to have a recognized relationship with 
the child seems to be motivated partly by a desire to facilitate the child’s ability 
to have a future relationship with their birth mother if they choose.192  
However, the issue on which there is the most divergence in opinion within each 
group of participants, when compared to views in relation to donors and 
traditional surrogates, is the legal recognition afforded to gestational surrogates 
when everyone is agreeable. Both groups of participants are more reluctant to 
allow a gestational surrogate any significant legal rights, whereas opinion in 
                                            
191 See figures 6 – 8. 
192 As Connie comments: ‘you wouldn’t want the child to go suddenly when they are in their 
teens, that lady across the road who we see every day is my genetic mother and my birth 
mother. It would have to be done so it’s not a shock to the child’. 
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relation to donors and traditional surrogates was divided. The most interesting 
difference, however, is that the majority of participants in the California group 
are reluctant to grant a gestational surrogate any legal rights even where there 
is agreement. This stands in contrast to the E&W group where opinion is much 
more divided on the issue.193 
There could be a number of explanations for this divergence of opinion between 
Californian participants and those from E&W. As Vinnie commented, answers to 
these questions depend to an extent on one’s ‘religious, social worldview’. 
Perhaps surrogacy is more culturally accepted in California and as a result more 
on a par with gamete donation than is the case in E&W. This could partially 
explain why Californian participants are just as comfortable excluding the 
surrogate as they, and we, might be in relation to the donor. In this regard, the 
cultural and social context in which the law operates is important in 
understanding differences in responses between the two jurisdictions. However, 
it is also important to recognize that the law regulates the issue of gestational 
surrogacy in very different ways in the two jurisdictions. 
As alluded to in the previous chapter and discussed in depth in chapter 2, 
Californian law, at least in relation to gestational surrogates, gives greater 
weight to the intention of the parties than it does to the fact of gestation. By 
contrast, the law of E&W considers the birth mother to be the legal mother until 
she relinquishes that status. This difference in legal recognition was aptly 
summed up by Carmen’s (CA) comment that: 
The laws are different in the US so the ways I’ve always looked at 
it may be a little different. In the United States it’s all about intent. 
If the intent of the donor/surrogate is not to parent the child but just 
to be the donor/surrogate then they are not considered the parents 
at all. Their name is not on the birth certificate. It is the intent that 
counts in law. 
This notion that it is the intentions of the parties that should be recognised by 
the law is reflected in the opinions of a number of participants. Annabel (CA) 
stresses that, ‘if you are agreeing to do that for somebody else then you should 
be prepared for the fact that you are doing this for a couple so they can have 
their own child or you shouldn’t do it’. Therefore, there seems to be a general 
sense amongst the Californian participants that gestational surrogates go into 
                                            
193 See figure 8. 
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the surrogacy arrangement with their eyes open and that they need to follow 
through on the commitment they made. 
Opinion on this issue is, however, more divided amongst the participants from 
E&W. There is a sense amongst some that intentions need to be honoured in a 
sperm donor arrangement but that surrogacy presents slightly different issues. 
Connie (E&W) highlights that ‘to me a donor is just a donor not a parent to that 
child nor should they be expected to be because that’s not what anyone bought 
into when they agreed’. However she goes on to stress that ‘I think the 
surrogate should initially be considered as the legal mother. It has to be the 
person to give birth to the child because that’s the only thing you can track’. 
Therefore, there is a suggestion here that there is something inherently 
desirable about recognising the birth mother as the legal mother, despite the 
fact she had originally agreed to a surrogacy arrangement in which she would 
not be the legal mother. 
This, however, does not reflect the opinion of a number of participants from 
E&W who feels that the act of gestation affords the surrogate no greater claim 
to parenthood than say a donor. As Dianne (E&W) comments, ‘I almost see the 
carrier as just an oven for 9 months. I don’t think they have any right to the child 
at all’. This is supported by Eric’s (E&W) suggestion that ‘I don’t see a 
gestational surrogate as having any connection to the child. I just see her as a 
human test-tube basically’. Therefore, whilst some view the act of carrying the 
child as a sufficient trigger for legal parenthood, others feel that the lack of 
biological connection means that such legal recognition is not deserved. As 
Kathy (E&W) comments: 
The law is weird at present regarding host surrogacy, even though 
the surrogate has no biological link to the baby she usually has to 
have the last say on any medical procedures the baby may need 
until the parental order is in place be it donor or an embryo from 
the Intended Parents. 
This raises the question of how important biology should be in recognising legal 
parenthood following ART. There is a sense amongst participants both from 
California and E&W that biology should not necessarily be determinative of legal 
parenthood but rather caring for the child and the intention to care for the child 
should have greater influence. As Tammy (CA) notes, ‘[surrogates] have no 
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legal rights or obligations… genes don’t create the bond, parenting creates the 
bond.’ This is reflected in the views of a number of participants. Dianne, for 
example, stresses that: 
if I’m in a relationship and decide to have a child with the partner 
and we can’t carry the child, we are still the child’s parents and it’s 
the upbringing that we provide that child that makes us its parents. 
The child is only there because we decided to create it. 
There is a suggestion that the intentions of the intended parents to have the 
child should be determinative of legal parenthood because ‘but for’ these 
intentions the child would not exist. Interestingly this view was held by a number 
of participants in each jurisdiction including the pilot group.  
5.4 Co-Parenting 
In the final section of this chapter, the implications of the foregoing sections for 
the legal recognition of co-parenting arrangements will be discussed within a 
socio-legal theoretical framework. Socio-legal theory suggests that the values 
inherent in the research should be brought to the forefront.194 In the context of 
family law research such as this, the implicit aim is to ‘create a more socially just 
society’.195 In relation to the present study this pertains to the social exclusion of 
alternative families by not legally recognizing the family structures they create, 
which are a legitimate expression of what Foucault terms the ‘practices of 
freedom.196 The critical stance that has permeated this study is that the present 
curtailment of this freedom lacks the necessary justification, but is rather 
underpinned by an uncritical acceptance of the traditional two-parent model.197  
This seems to be reflected in the empirical data collected, which suggests that 
participants had no principled objection to recognising co-parenting 
arrangements and did in fact see some benefit to that. This would seem to fit 
with the idea that it is important that the law of parenthood honours parties’ 
intentions, as discussed in the previous section. In light of this, participants’ 
                                            
194 See Simon Jolly, ‘Family Law’ in Philip Thomas (ed) Socio-Legal Studies (Dartmouth, 
Aldershot 1997) 350. 
195 M.D.A Freeman, ‘Towards a Critical Theory of Family Law’ (1985) 38 Current Legal 
Problems 153, 155. 
196 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume 1: An Introduction (Penguin, 
Harmondsworth 1979). See also Jeffrey Weeks, Invented Moralities: Sexual Values in an Age of 
Uncertainty (Polity Press, Cambridge 1995) 50 - 58.  
197 See Julie McCandless and Sally Sheldon. 'The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 
(2008) and the Tenacity of the Sexual Family' (2010) 73(2) MLR 175, 192. 
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ambivalence to legally recognising co-parenting arrangements may be 
explained by a lack of personal experience with them and an inability to see 
how the very real concerns associated with any type of shared parenting are 
going to be overcome.198  
There is a sense that people will and do create these types of arrangements 
regardless of the legal recognition. As Tammy highlights ‘people do it anyway 
and they just have their own mutual agreements’. However this does not justify 
the lack of legal recognition, which can lead to social exclusion. Carmen 
stresses the fact that legal recognition and social recognition go ‘hand in hand’ 
and that not recognising co-parenting arrangements in law means that there ‘is 
some denial’ of social recognition for these alternative family forms. The law’s 
lack of recognition for these families would seem to be unjustified and untenable 
given the potential for social exclusion this could create which runs contrary to 
the drive towards equality amongst family forms that exist within society.   
5.5 Conclusion 
The previous chapter concluded that co-parenting arrangements were not 
something that the majority of these participants sought. However, there was a 
sense of recognition that they might be desirable for some people, particularly 
same-sex couples. The previous sections have noted that views are broadly 
divided on legally recognising the donor/surrogate if everyone is agreeable. 
However, there is a greater resistance do doing so if the surrogate is a 
gestational carrier and not genetically related to the child. This implies that 
legally recognising biology is important for these participants. However, when 
the issue is explored further biology is revealed as important but not as 
important as the intention to parent the child.  
When the importance of intention is considered in the context of co-parenting 
arrangements, the question the law must answer is whether it will reflect the 
intentions and realities of families engaged in these arrangements or whether 
there is some compelling reason to adhere to the two parent model.199  No 
                                            
198 As Kathy comments ‘we are all different, so what is right for us may not be for other couples 
and if an arrangement is made that parties are happy with…then good luck to them but I really 
feel there could be problems that arise later on regarding the child's upbringing etc.’ 
199 The intentionality argument raises the issue of whether the law in England and Wales should 
take the same route as the Canadian law in allowing three parents to be legally recognised. For 
more on this see Chapter 2: Literature review p 23. 
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definitive recommendation can be made on the basis of the present study. 
However there is a definite sense that the current participants would not be 
opposed to recognising such arrangements in principle but further research will 
be required to assess how appropriate such legal recognition would be. The 
present study has been focussed on the views of parents and potential parents. 
Responses from participants indicate how this tends to ignore child welfare 
issues. Potentially, therefore, it will be important in future research that the 
views of donor conceived children are adequately represented.200 
                                            
200 Arguments in relation to child welfare may well take the debate in a different direction from 
those focussing on equality between parents. The best interests of the child need not, however, 
be an absolute trump over all other arguments. See on this Helen Reece, ‘The Paramountcy 
Principle’ (1996) 49 Current Legal Problems 267. 
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6. Conclusion 
Through the use of socio-legal research methods, this project has sought to test 
the law’s implicit assumption, in the context of assisted reproduction, that a 
person can have no more than two parents. Despite limitations on the size of 
the sample, the study has canvassed a range of views on the involvement of 
donors and surrogates and the legal recognition they deserve. The impression 
that has emerged from analysing the data, using a grounded theory approach, 
is that co-parenting arrangements may not hold the same appeal for 
heterosexual couples as they potentially do for same-sex couples. Although 
there didn’t seem to be a strong objection in principle to co-parenting 
arrangements, there was a definite suggestion amongst the mainly heterosexual 
participants in this study that it was ‘not for us’. Conversely, co-parenting 
arrangements were seen as being of potential benefit to same-sex couples, 
provided everyone was agreeable. During the course of the research, it became 
clear that the views of more same-sex participants would be beneficial given the 
emerging suggestion that these arrangements would be of more interest to this 
group.201 This is, however, a hard-to-access group and further research in this 
area would benefit from a longer period in which to recruit the sample. 
The project successfully combined quantitative and qualitative methodology in a 
mixed method approach to the topic. The quantitative data analysis indicated 
that participants from both England and Wales and California shared the same 
reticence in relation to donor involvement and legal recognition of donors but 
that there was a greater reluctance on the part of participants from England and 
Wales to cut the surrogate out completely. The qualitative data analysis 
revealed that in England Wales this reluctance to sever the link with the 
surrogate is motivated by a sense that there is a strong connection between the 
surrogate and the child. By contrast, there was a sense among the Californian 
participants that surrogates were in a similar position as donors and must 
honour their intentions. This difference in opinion may be partially explained by 
the different social and cultural context that operates in these two jurisdictions. 
This corresponds with the argument put forward in the literature that in the 
                                            
201 For a discussion of the sampling strategies used in response to this see Chapter 3: 
Methodology pp 31 – 32. 
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context of ART intentionality is a stronger basis for conferring legal parenthood 
in the context of ART than biology.202 
Overall, therefore, this project has been a successful initial exploration of the 
issues surrounding co-parenting. It has been a learning experience in terms of 
the sampling techniques required to recruit participants in these hard to access 
groups but also in terms of the most beneficial scope of future research. This 
project has been focussed on the views of donor parents. However, as has 
been pointed out by a number of participants, future research might fruitfully 
consider the views of children born using ART. It would be particularly useful to 
recruit participants currently engaging in some form of co-parenting, perhaps 
from a jurisdiction where that family form can be legally recognised such as 
Canada. This study has successfully canvassed a range of views on co-
parenting following ART and attempted to triangulate this with the existing 
literature in order to gain a fuller understanding of the issues. It has, however, 
also indicated areas, which might benefit from further research. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
202 For a detailed discussion of this see Chapter 2: Literature Review 17 – 22. 
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Appendix 1: Information Sheet, Consent Form and 
Questionnaire203 
Project Information for Participants 
 
The researchers and the project 
 
This research is being conducted by Philip Bremner (pdb203@exeter.ac.uk), a 
postgraduate student in the School of Law at the University of Exeter, as part 
of his Masters degree dissertation project. The project is being supervised by 
Anne Barlow (A.E.Barlow@exeter.ac.uk), who is Professor of Family Law and 
Policy. The aim is to seek parents’ views about the involvement of donors and 
surrogates in the lives of their children who have been born using assisted 
reproductive technology (ART). The hope is to use the data from this research 
project to evaluate how suitable the law is in different jurisdictions, particularly 
in regard to who is considered a parent of children born using ART. 
 
How were the participants selected? 
 
The participants in this project are (potential) parents of children who were born 
using ART, which includes sperm donation, egg donation and surrogacy. This 
study was advertised through various support groups and agencies in order to 
recruit participants, where a link was posted to this online survey. 
 
What will participants be asked to do? 
 
If you decide to participate in this project, please read the consent form below 
and indicate that you agree to this by ticking the box. Once you have done this 
you will be able to continue on to the questionnaire which should not take more 
than 20 minutes to complete. At the end of the questionnaire you will be asked 
for your contact details if you wish to be involved in further research. You may 
then be asked to participate in a follow-up interview, which will explore the 
answers you gave to the questionnaire in more detail. We only require a 
selection of participants to take part in interviews. 
 
Arrangements for Withdrawal of Participants 
 
Your participation in the project is entirely voluntary and you are entitled to 
withdraw from the project at any point, and are not required to give your 
reasons for so doing. Please be assured that you are completely free to decline 
to answer any question if you are not comfortable doing so. 
 
Arrangements to Ensure Confidentiality 
 
The interviews will be transcribed and the information contained in the 
transcripts, along with the questionnaires, is kept anonymous so that your true 
identity and answers will not be attributed to you personally in any publication. 
The transcripts and questionnaires will be saved on a PC that will be password 
protected and stored in a locked room. 
                                            
203 These all appeared together as part of the online questionnaire. As the questionnaire was 
downloaded from the website, further formatting was not possible.  
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Arrangements for Dissemination of Results 
 
Results will be written up in the form of a Masters degree dissertation, parts of 
which may be published as articles within respected academic journals and 
presented in the form of conference papers. In all cases professional research 
ethics will be adhered to and appropriate confidentiality maintained; we will 
seek to provide a balanced and scholarly depiction of research findings. 
 
Arrangements for Provision of Results to Participants 
 
If you would like a summary of the outcome of the project please e-mail Philip 
and he will be happy to send this to you once the project is concluded. 
 
Consent Form * 
 
1. I have read and understand the above Information Sheet relating to the 
Social Parentage and Assisted Reproduction project. 2. I understand the 
purposes of the project and what will be required of me, and any questions I 
have had have been answered to my satisfaction. I agree to the arrangements 
described in the Information Sheet in so far as they relate to my participation. 3. 
I understand that participation is entirely voluntary and that I have the right to 
withdraw from the project at any time. 4. I have received a copy of this Consent 
Form and of the accompanying Information Sheet. 5. I am happy for 
anonymised data from this research project to be retained for up to 5 years for 
use in subsequent PhD research. 
 
By ticking this box you agree to the above statements 
 
We may wish to contact you for participation in future PhD research. If you 
are happy for us to retain your contact details for up to 3 years please tick 
the box. You are not bound in any way to participate in future research and 
may withdraw consent to us retaining your contact details at any time. 
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Appendix 2: Example Interview Guide 
OK to record? 
 
Opening Remarks 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. 
 
It’s been a couple of weeks now since you completed the questionnaire. So I 
would just like to remind you of some of things that were in the information 
sheet and consent form for that if that’s ok? 
 
Firstly, participation in this study is entirely voluntary. So if at any point you do 
not feel comfortable answering a question or you want to end the interview, you 
are free to do so. In addition, your answers will remain confidential and will be 
stored anonymously so that they cannot be attributed to you. Finally, if at any 
time you want me to clarify something or explain what I mean, please don’t 
hesitate to ask. Are you quite happy with all of that? 
 
The interview should last about 30 – 45 minutes. There will be two main sets of 
questions, one relating to donor/surrogate involvement in the child’s life and the 
other about legal recognition as a parent. Before we get to that though… 
 
Introductory Question 
 
1. Perhaps you could begin by telling me a little bit about your experiences 
with assisted reproduction technology. I believe you mentioned in the 
questionnaire that your 15 year old son was conceived using donor 
sperm. So perhaps you could just elaborate on how you came to make 
the choices you did about having children in this way? 
a. What other options did you consider? Did you see any potential 
downsides to this option? Why did you settle on this option in the 
end? In hindsight, has it worked out the way you had hoped? 
 
 
Donor/Surrogate Involvement 
 
2. If I can just remind you of the first bank of questions in the questionnaire, 
you were presented with a hypothetical situation where an infertile couple 
(Sam and Christina) needed a sperm donor in order to have a child. The 
questionnaire presented you with a range of options and asked how likely 
you would be to consider each of these options. The options included 
using an anonymous donor or a known donor and arranging insemination 
privately or seeking treatment in a clinic. Each of these would have 
different legal consequences. I believe you indicated that if you were in 
their situation that you would not want a known donor but would rather 
use an anonymous donor receiving treatment at a licensed clinic and that 
that was in fact similar to the situation you were in with your then 
husband. Is that right?  
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a. Perhaps you could elaborate on why you would not want to 
engage in a co-parenting project, for example, with a known donor 
or have the donor heavily involved in the child’s life? 
b. Sam and Christina could be a heterosexual or homosexual couple. 
Would that affect your views on whether the donor should be 
involved in the child’s life? Do you think it would be in the best 
interests of the child for the donor to be involved 
c. Although you personally would not want the donor involved in the 
child’s life to any great extent you indicated that you thought the 
parties should be allowed to agree amongst themselves the extent 
to which the donor was involved in child’s life, including the donor 
being considered a co-parent alongside the couple. Can you 
envisage a situation where all the parties might want to create a 
co-parenting arrangement? How realistic do you think it is that 
people might want to do that? Do you think people might be 
discouraged from doing that because the law only recognises two 
parents of a child? Do you think the law should recognise more 
than two parents? Why? 
 
3. The questionnaire then went on to present a situation where an infertile 
couple (Alex and Pete) needed a surrogate in order to have a child. It 
explained that the surrogate would be considered the legal mother of the 
child until a court order was obtained, which the surrogate would have to 
consent to. In this case, the scenario involved a traditional surrogate who 
was genetically related to the child. I believe you indicated that you were 
not at all likely to use a surrogate if you were in that situation but that 
again the parties should be able to decide on the extent of the 
surrogate’s involvement. Is that right? 
 
a. Do you feel that surrogate involvement in the child’s life presents 
different or similar issues to donor involvement? Do you feel 
differently or the same about surrogate involvement as you do 
about donor involvement? Why? 
 
4. The final scenario asked you to consider a situation involving a 
gestational surrogate who was not genetically related to the child 
because the couple has used an anonymous egg donor. 
 
a. What impact does the fact that the surrogate is not genetically 
related to the child have on your views about surrogate 
involvement in the child’s life? 
 
Legal Recognition of Donor/Surrogate 
 
5. Do you know of anyone or have heard of anyone who might benefit from 
the law recognising more than two parents or who might be in a situation 
similar to those described in the questionnaire? Tell me about it… 
 
a. Do you think this would be particularly beneficial for same-sex 
couples? Would it have any appeal for heterosexual couples in 
your opinion? 
 77 
6. I would be grateful if you would be willing to pass on details of the study 
because at the moment I am struggling to get participants, particularly in 
same-sex relationships but of course only if you feel comfortable doing 
that. 
 
7. Do you think the status of being formally recognised as a parent is 
important and what impact do you think the donor being recognised as a 
parent alongside the infertile couple would have on the family? 
 
a. Is it important that people who are biologically related to the child 
are considered as parents as much as possible or is it perhaps 
more important that the intentions of the parties determine who is 
the parent?  
b. Do you think the effect would be positive or negative and would 
their be any risks or benefits associated with it? 
c. What does being a parent and being recognised as a parent mean 
to you? 
 
Concluding Questions 
 
8. Would you say your views have changed in any way as a result of having 
participated in this study? Did it perhaps make you consider these issues 
in more depth than you had previously? 
9. My final question is whether you might know of anyone else who would 
be interested in participating in this study? 
 
That pretty much concludes the interview Thank you very much for your time 
and for the answers you have given. Do you have comments or questions you’d 
like to raise about the study or any of the issues that we have discussed? 
 
I see that you’ve said that we can retain your contact details for future research 
so I may well be in touch again in the future if that’s still alright? 
 
Thanks again for your participation. 
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Appendix 3: Table of Participants’ Jurisdiction 
North America E&W 
Sherry Eric 
Annabel Dianne 
Sonia Anna  
Carmen Cathy 
Vinnie Connie 
Anne-Marie Susan 
Tammy Erica 
 Julie 
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Appendix 4: Chi Square Contingency Tables - Friends as 
Donors and Surrogates 
 
Table 1: Donor vs Traditional Surrogate (Ask Friend) 
 
Friend as traditional surrogate 
Total Not Likely Possibility Likely 
Friend 
as 
donor 
Possibility Count 2 2 3 7 
Expected Count 4.7 1.6 .8 7.0 
Not Likely Count 12 1 0 13 
Expected Count 8.7 2.9 1.4 13.0 
Likely Count 4 3 0 7 
Expected Count 4.7 1.6 .8 7.0 
Total Count 18 6 3 27 
Expected Count 18.0 6.0 3.0 27.0 
 
 
Table 2: Donor vs Gestational Surrogate (Ask Friend) 
 
Friend as gestational 
surrogate 
Total Possibility Not Likely Likely 
Friend 
as 
donor 
Possibility Count 4 1 2 7 
Expected Count 1.8 3.9 1.3 7.0 
Not Likely Count 0 11 2 13 
Expected Count 3.4 7.2 2.4 13.0 
Likely Count 3 3 1 7 
Expected Count 1.8 3.9 1.3 7.0 
Total Count 7 15 5 27 
Expected Count 7.0 15.0 5.0 27.0 
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